合并 feature/sm4-sbox-bitslice：v0.1.0 发布准备
包含： - 初始提交：SM2/SM3/SM4/SM9 密码算法库 - 安全加固：常量时间改进与侧信道缓解 - 性能优化：核心算法加速 - 准备发布 v0.1.0
This commit is contained in:
huangxt
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
||||
# Changelog
|
||||
|
||||
All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
|
||||
|
||||
The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
|
||||
and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
|
||||
|
||||
## [0.1.0] - 2025-03-07
|
||||
|
||||
### Added
|
||||
|
||||
- SM2 elliptic curve cryptography (GB/T 32918.1-5-2016)
|
||||
- Key generation, digital signature (with Z-value), public key encryption/decryption
|
||||
- Complete addition formulas for constant-time point operations
|
||||
- Fixed-window (w=4) base point scalar multiplication with precomputed table
|
||||
- Mixed Jacobian-Affine addition for optimized verification (Shamir's trick)
|
||||
- Point compression/decompression (GB/T 32918.1 section 4.2.10)
|
||||
- SM3 cryptographic hash (GB/T 32905-2016)
|
||||
- Streaming and one-shot hashing API
|
||||
- HMAC-SM3 with automatic key material zeroization
|
||||
- SM4 block cipher (GB/T 32907-2016)
|
||||
- Boolean circuit bitslice S-box (cache-timing resistant)
|
||||
- 8 modes of operation: ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB, CTR, GCM, CCM, XTS
|
||||
- GCM/CCM authenticated encryption with constant-time tag verification
|
||||
- SM9 identity-based cryptography (GB/T 38635.1-2-2020)
|
||||
- BN256 pairing (optimal Ate with Miller loop + final exponentiation)
|
||||
- Fp12 tower extension: Fp -> Fp2(u^2+2) -> Fp6(v^3-u) -> Fp12(w^2-v)
|
||||
- Identity-based signing and verification
|
||||
- Identity-based encryption and decryption
|
||||
- Unified `Error` enum with `Display` and conditional `std::error::Error` impl
|
||||
- `no_std` support with optional `alloc` and `std` features
|
||||
- `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` enforced at crate level
|
||||
- Automatic private key zeroization via `zeroize::ZeroizeOnDrop`
|
||||
- GB/T standard test vectors for all algorithms
|
||||
|
||||
### Security
|
||||
|
||||
- GCM `gf128_mul`: replaced secret-dependent `if` branches with mask arithmetic
|
||||
- SM2 `is_infinity`: replaced short-circuit `Iterator::all` with `ConstantTimeEq`
|
||||
- SM2 `add`: replaced 3 conditional branches with complete addition formulas + `conditional_select`
|
||||
- SM2 `double`: replaced `if is_infinity()` with `conditional_select`
|
||||
- HMAC-SM3: added `zeroize` for `k_pad`/`ipad`/`opad` key material on stack
|
||||
- CCM: reject AAD > 510 bytes instead of silently skipping
|
||||
- XTS: reject non-16-byte-aligned input instead of silently truncating
|
||||
- SM9 `hash_to_range`: replaced variable-iteration `while` loop with constant-time conditional select
|
||||
|
||||
[0.1.0]: https://github.com/aspect-building/libsmx/releases/tag/v0.1.0
|
||||
+11
-3
@@ -4,18 +4,26 @@ version = "0.1.0"
|
||||
edition = "2021"
|
||||
rust-version = "1.72.0"
|
||||
license = "Apache-2.0"
|
||||
description = "Production-grade Chinese commercial cryptography (SM2/SM3/SM4/SM9) with constant-time operations and no_std support"
|
||||
repository = "https://github.com/your-org/libsmx"
|
||||
description = "Pure-Rust, no_std, constant-time SM2/SM3/SM4/SM9 Chinese cryptography (GB/T 32918/32905/32907/38635)"
|
||||
repository = "https://github.com/aspect-building/libsmx"
|
||||
documentation = "https://docs.rs/libsmx"
|
||||
homepage = "https://github.com/your-org/libsmx"
|
||||
homepage = "https://github.com/aspect-building/libsmx"
|
||||
categories = ["cryptography", "no-std"]
|
||||
keywords = ["sm2", "sm3", "sm4", "sm9", "gmssl"]
|
||||
readme = "README.md"
|
||||
exclude = [
|
||||
"benches/",
|
||||
"tests/",
|
||||
"docs/",
|
||||
".github/",
|
||||
"scripts/",
|
||||
"reference/",
|
||||
"*.sh",
|
||||
"*.md",
|
||||
"!README.md",
|
||||
"!CHANGELOG.md",
|
||||
"!SECURITY.md",
|
||||
".claude*",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
[lib]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
|
||||
|
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@@ -1,82 +1,174 @@
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# libsmx
|
||||
|
||||
生产级中国商用密码算法库，纯 Rust 实现。
|
||||
[](https://crates.io/crates/libsmx)
|
||||
[](https://docs.rs/libsmx)
|
||||
[](LICENSE)
|
||||
[](https://blog.rust-lang.org/2023/08/24/Rust-1.72.0.html)
|
||||
|
||||
## 算法支持
|
||||
Pure-Rust, `#![no_std]` implementation of Chinese commercial cryptography standards with constant-time operations throughout.
|
||||
|
||||
| 算法 | 标准 | 功能 |
|
||||
|------|------|------|
|
||||
| SM2 | GB/T 32918.1-5-2016 | 密钥生成、数字签名（含 Z 值）、公钥加解密 |
|
||||
| SM3 | GB/T 32905-2013 | 哈希函数 |
|
||||
| SM4 | GB/T 32907-2016 | ECB/CBC/OFB/CFB/CTR/GCM/CCM/XTS 模式 |
|
||||
| SM9 | GB/T 38635.1-2-2020 | BN256 配对密码，签名、加密 |
|
||||
| Algorithm | Standard | Description |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|-------------|
|
||||
| **SM2** | GB/T 32918.1-5-2016 | Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptography |
|
||||
| **SM3** | GB/T 32905-2016 | Cryptographic Hash Algorithm (256-bit) |
|
||||
| **SM4** | GB/T 32907-2016 | Block Cipher (128-bit key, ECB/CBC/CTR/GCM/CCM/XTS) |
|
||||
| **SM9** | GB/T 38635.1-2-2020 | Identity-Based Cryptography (BN256 pairing) |
|
||||
|
||||
## 特性
|
||||
## Features
|
||||
|
||||
- **常量时间**：使用 `crypto-bigint::ConstMontyForm` 和 `subtle::ConstantTimeEq`
|
||||
- **内存安全**：私钥通过 `zeroize::ZeroizeOnDrop` 在 Drop 时自动清零
|
||||
- **no_std 兼容**：默认启用 `alloc` feature，核心算法支持裸机环境
|
||||
- **零 unsafe**（除 crypto-bigint 内部）
|
||||
- **`#![no_std]`** — works in embedded, WASM, and bare-metal environments
|
||||
- **`#![forbid(unsafe_code)]`** — zero `unsafe` blocks
|
||||
- **Constant-time** — all secret-dependent operations use [`subtle`](https://docs.rs/subtle) primitives
|
||||
- **Auto-zeroize** — private keys cleared on drop via [`zeroize`](https://docs.rs/zeroize)
|
||||
- **Side-channel resistant SM4 S-box** — boolean circuit bitslice (no table lookup)
|
||||
- **Complete EC formulas** — SM2 point addition uses branch-free complete formulas
|
||||
|
||||
## 快速开始
|
||||
## Quick Start
|
||||
|
||||
Add to `Cargo.toml`:
|
||||
|
||||
```toml
|
||||
[dependencies]
|
||||
libsmx = "0.1"
|
||||
libsmx = "0.3"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### SM3 哈希
|
||||
### SM3 Hash
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
use libsmx::sm3::Sm3Hasher;
|
||||
|
||||
// One-shot hash
|
||||
let digest = Sm3Hasher::digest(b"abc");
|
||||
assert_eq!(digest.len(), 32);
|
||||
|
||||
// Streaming hash
|
||||
let mut h = Sm3Hasher::new();
|
||||
h.update(b"hello");
|
||||
let digest = h.finalize(); // [u8; 32]
|
||||
h.update(b"ab");
|
||||
h.update(b"c");
|
||||
assert_eq!(h.finalize(), digest);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### SM4-GCM 加密
|
||||
### SM3 HMAC
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
use libsmx::sm4::modes::{sm4_encrypt_gcm, sm4_decrypt_gcm};
|
||||
use libsmx::sm3::hmac_sm3;
|
||||
|
||||
let mac = hmac_sm3(b"secret-key", b"message");
|
||||
assert_eq!(mac.len(), 32);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### SM2 Sign / Verify
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
use libsmx::sm2::{generate_keypair, get_z, get_e, sign, verify};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut rng = rand::rngs::OsRng;
|
||||
|
||||
// Key generation
|
||||
let (pri_key, pub_key) = generate_keypair(&mut rng);
|
||||
|
||||
// Sign: compute Z value and message digest per GB/T 32918.2
|
||||
let z = get_z(b"1234567812345678", &pub_key);
|
||||
let e = get_e(&z, b"hello SM2");
|
||||
let sig = sign(&e, &pri_key, &mut rng);
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify
|
||||
verify(&e, &pub_key, &sig).expect("signature valid");
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### SM4 GCM (AEAD)
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
use libsmx::sm4::{sm4_encrypt_gcm, sm4_decrypt_gcm};
|
||||
|
||||
let key = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let nonce = [1u8; 12];
|
||||
let (ciphertext, tag) = sm4_encrypt_gcm(&key, &nonce, b"aad", b"plaintext");
|
||||
let plaintext = sm4_decrypt_gcm(&key, &nonce, b"aad", &ciphertext, &tag).unwrap();
|
||||
let nonce = [0u8; 12];
|
||||
let aad = b"additional data";
|
||||
let plaintext = b"secret message";
|
||||
|
||||
let (ciphertext, tag) = sm4_encrypt_gcm(&key, &nonce, aad, plaintext);
|
||||
let decrypted = sm4_decrypt_gcm(&key, &nonce, aad, &ciphertext, &tag).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(decrypted, plaintext);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### SM2 签名
|
||||
### SM4 CBC
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
use libsmx::sm2::{generate_keypair, sign, verify, get_z, get_e};
|
||||
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
|
||||
use libsmx::sm4::{sm4_encrypt_cbc, sm4_decrypt_cbc};
|
||||
|
||||
let (priv_key, pub_key) = generate_keypair(&mut OsRng);
|
||||
let id = b"1234567812345678";
|
||||
let msg = b"hello sm2";
|
||||
let z = get_z(id, &pub_key);
|
||||
let e = get_e(&z, msg);
|
||||
let sig = sign(&e, &priv_key, &mut OsRng);
|
||||
verify(&e, &pub_key, &sig).unwrap();
|
||||
let key = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let iv = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let plaintext = [0u8; 32]; // must be 16-byte aligned
|
||||
|
||||
let ciphertext = sm4_encrypt_cbc(&key, &iv, &plaintext);
|
||||
let decrypted = sm4_decrypt_cbc(&key, &iv, &ciphertext);
|
||||
assert_eq!(decrypted, plaintext);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### SM9 配对
|
||||
### SM9 Identity-Based Sign / Verify
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
use libsmx::sm9::{generate_sign_master_keypair, generate_sign_user_key, sm9_sign, sm9_verify};
|
||||
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
|
||||
use libsmx::sm9::{generate_sign_master_keypair, generate_sign_user_key};
|
||||
use libsmx::sm9::{sm9_sign, sm9_verify};
|
||||
|
||||
let (ks, ppub) = generate_sign_master_keypair(&mut OsRng);
|
||||
let da = generate_sign_user_key(&ks, b"Alice").unwrap();
|
||||
let (h, s) = sm9_sign(b"message", &da, &ppub, &mut OsRng).unwrap();
|
||||
sm9_verify(b"message", &h, &s, b"Alice", &ppub).unwrap();
|
||||
let mut rng = rand::rngs::OsRng;
|
||||
|
||||
// KGC generates master keypair
|
||||
let (master_priv, sign_pub) = generate_sign_master_keypair(&mut rng);
|
||||
|
||||
// KGC generates user signing key for identity
|
||||
let user_id = b"alice@example.com";
|
||||
let user_key = generate_sign_user_key(&master_priv, user_id).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
// User signs message
|
||||
let msg = b"hello SM9";
|
||||
let (h, s) = sm9_sign(msg, &user_key, &sign_pub, &mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
// Anyone can verify with user's identity + master public key
|
||||
sm9_verify(msg, &h, &s, user_id, &sign_pub).unwrap();
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## MSRV
|
||||
## Supported SM4 Modes
|
||||
|
||||
Rust 1.72.0
|
||||
| Mode | Encrypt | Decrypt |
|
||||
|------|---------|---------|
|
||||
| ECB | `sm4_encrypt_ecb` | `sm4_decrypt_ecb` |
|
||||
| CBC | `sm4_encrypt_cbc` | `sm4_decrypt_cbc` |
|
||||
| OFB | `sm4_crypt_ofb` | `sm4_crypt_ofb` |
|
||||
| CFB | `sm4_encrypt_cfb` | `sm4_decrypt_cfb` |
|
||||
| CTR | `sm4_crypt_ctr` | `sm4_crypt_ctr` |
|
||||
| GCM | `sm4_encrypt_gcm` | `sm4_decrypt_gcm` |
|
||||
| CCM | `sm4_encrypt_ccm` | `sm4_decrypt_ccm` |
|
||||
| XTS | `sm4_encrypt_xts` | `sm4_decrypt_xts` |
|
||||
|
||||
## 许可证
|
||||
## Feature Flags
|
||||
|
||||
Apache-2.0
|
||||
| Feature | Default | Description |
|
||||
|---------|---------|-------------|
|
||||
| `alloc` | Yes | Enables `Vec`-returning APIs (SM2/SM9 encrypt/decrypt, SM4 modes) |
|
||||
| `std` | No | Enables `std::error::Error` impl and re-exports `rand_core/std` |
|
||||
|
||||
For `no_std` without `alloc`:
|
||||
|
||||
```toml
|
||||
[dependencies]
|
||||
libsmx = { version = "0.3", default-features = false }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Security
|
||||
|
||||
- All secret-dependent operations are constant-time (fixed iteration counts, mask-based selection)
|
||||
- SM4 S-box uses boolean circuit bitslice — zero memory access patterns, immune to cache-timing attacks
|
||||
- SM2 scalar multiplication uses complete addition formulas with no data-dependent branches
|
||||
- Private keys implement `ZeroizeOnDrop` for automatic cleanup
|
||||
- GCM/CCM authentication tags are verified in constant time
|
||||
|
||||
> **Disclaimer**: This library has **not** been independently audited. See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for vulnerability reporting.
|
||||
|
||||
## MSRV Policy
|
||||
|
||||
The minimum supported Rust version is **1.72.0**. MSRV bumps are treated as minor version changes.
|
||||
|
||||
## License
|
||||
|
||||
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0. See [LICENSE](LICENSE) for details.
|
||||
|
||||
+209
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
|
||||
# libsmx
|
||||
|
||||
[](https://crates.io/crates/libsmx)
|
||||
[](https://docs.rs/libsmx)
|
||||
[](LICENSE)
|
||||
[](https://blog.rust-lang.org/2023/08/24/Rust-1.72.0.html)
|
||||
|
||||
纯 Rust、`#![no_std]` 实现的中国商用密码算法库，全程常量时间操作。
|
||||
|
||||
| 算法 | 标准 | 说明 |
|
||||
|------|------|------|
|
||||
| **SM2** | GB/T 32918.1-5-2016 | 椭圆曲线公钥密码 |
|
||||
| **SM3** | GB/T 32905-2016 | 密码杂凑算法（256 位） |
|
||||
| **SM4** | GB/T 32907-2016 | 分组密码（128 位密钥，ECB/CBC/CTR/GCM/CCM/XTS） |
|
||||
| **SM9** | GB/T 38635.1-2-2020 | 标识密码（BN256 双线性配对） |
|
||||
|
||||
## 特性
|
||||
|
||||
- **`#![no_std]`** — 支持嵌入式、WASM 及裸机环境
|
||||
- **`#![forbid(unsafe_code)]`** — 零 `unsafe` 块
|
||||
- **常量时间** — 所有涉密操作均使用 [`subtle`](https://docs.rs/subtle) 原语，防时序侧信道
|
||||
- **自动清零** — 私钥离开作用域后经由 [`zeroize`](https://docs.rs/zeroize) 自动清零
|
||||
- **SM4 S 盒抗侧信道** — 布尔电路位切片实现，无任何内存表查询，免疫缓存时序攻击
|
||||
- **SM2 完备加法公式** — 点加法使用无分支完备公式，杜绝特殊情况侧信道
|
||||
|
||||
## 快速开始
|
||||
|
||||
在 `Cargo.toml` 中添加依赖：
|
||||
|
||||
```toml
|
||||
[dependencies]
|
||||
libsmx = "0.3"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### SM3 哈希
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
use libsmx::sm3::Sm3Hasher;
|
||||
|
||||
// 一次性哈希
|
||||
let digest = Sm3Hasher::digest(b"abc");
|
||||
assert_eq!(digest.len(), 32);
|
||||
|
||||
// 流式哈希
|
||||
let mut h = Sm3Hasher::new();
|
||||
h.update(b"ab");
|
||||
h.update(b"c");
|
||||
assert_eq!(h.finalize(), digest);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### SM3 HMAC
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
use libsmx::sm3::hmac_sm3;
|
||||
|
||||
let mac = hmac_sm3(b"secret-key", b"message");
|
||||
assert_eq!(mac.len(), 32);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### SM2 签名 / 验签
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
use libsmx::sm2::{generate_keypair, get_z, get_e, sign, verify};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut rng = rand::rngs::OsRng;
|
||||
|
||||
// 生成密钥对
|
||||
let (pri_key, pub_key) = generate_keypair(&mut rng);
|
||||
|
||||
// 签名：按 GB/T 32918.2 计算 Z 值与消息摘要
|
||||
let z = get_z(b"1234567812345678", &pub_key);
|
||||
let e = get_e(&z, b"hello SM2");
|
||||
let sig = sign(&e, &pri_key, &mut rng);
|
||||
|
||||
// 验签
|
||||
verify(&e, &pub_key, &sig).expect("签名有效");
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### SM2 加密 / 解密
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
use libsmx::sm2::{generate_keypair, sm2_encrypt, sm2_decrypt};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut rng = rand::rngs::OsRng;
|
||||
let (pri_key, pub_key) = generate_keypair(&mut rng);
|
||||
|
||||
let plaintext = b"hello SM2 encrypt";
|
||||
let ciphertext = sm2_encrypt(&pub_key, plaintext, &mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
let decrypted = sm2_decrypt(&pri_key, &ciphertext).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(decrypted, plaintext);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### SM4-GCM（AEAD 认证加密）
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
use libsmx::sm4::{sm4_encrypt_gcm, sm4_decrypt_gcm};
|
||||
|
||||
let key = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let nonce = [0u8; 12];
|
||||
let aad = b"附加认证数据";
|
||||
let plaintext = b"机密消息";
|
||||
|
||||
let (ciphertext, tag) = sm4_encrypt_gcm(&key, &nonce, aad, plaintext);
|
||||
let decrypted = sm4_decrypt_gcm(&key, &nonce, aad, &ciphertext, &tag).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(decrypted, plaintext);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### SM4-CBC
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
use libsmx::sm4::{sm4_encrypt_cbc, sm4_decrypt_cbc};
|
||||
|
||||
let key = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let iv = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let plaintext = [0u8; 32]; // 须为 16 字节对齐
|
||||
|
||||
let ciphertext = sm4_encrypt_cbc(&key, &iv, &plaintext);
|
||||
let decrypted = sm4_decrypt_cbc(&key, &iv, &ciphertext);
|
||||
assert_eq!(decrypted, plaintext);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### SM9 标识签名 / 验签
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
use libsmx::sm9::{generate_sign_master_keypair, generate_sign_user_key};
|
||||
use libsmx::sm9::{sm9_sign, sm9_verify};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut rng = rand::rngs::OsRng;
|
||||
|
||||
// 密钥生成中心（KGC）生成主密钥对
|
||||
let (master_priv, sign_pub) = generate_sign_master_keypair(&mut rng);
|
||||
|
||||
// KGC 为用户标识派生签名私钥
|
||||
let user_id = b"alice@example.com";
|
||||
let user_key = generate_sign_user_key(&master_priv, user_id).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
// 用户签名
|
||||
let msg = b"hello SM9";
|
||||
let (h, s) = sm9_sign(msg, &user_key, &sign_pub, &mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
// 任意方可凭用户标识 + 主公钥验签
|
||||
sm9_verify(msg, &h, &s, user_id, &sign_pub).unwrap();
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### SM9 标识加密 / 解密
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
use libsmx::sm9::{generate_enc_master_keypair, generate_enc_user_key};
|
||||
use libsmx::sm9::{sm9_encrypt, sm9_decrypt};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut rng = rand::rngs::OsRng;
|
||||
|
||||
let (master_priv, enc_pub) = generate_enc_master_keypair(&mut rng);
|
||||
let user_id = b"bob@example.com";
|
||||
let user_key = generate_enc_user_key(&master_priv, user_id).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let plaintext = b"机密消息";
|
||||
let ciphertext = sm9_encrypt(user_id, plaintext, &enc_pub, &mut rng).unwrap();
|
||||
let decrypted = sm9_decrypt(user_id, &ciphertext, &user_key).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(decrypted, plaintext);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## SM4 支持的工作模式
|
||||
|
||||
| 模式 | 加密 | 解密 |
|
||||
|------|------|------|
|
||||
| ECB | `sm4_encrypt_ecb` | `sm4_decrypt_ecb` |
|
||||
| CBC | `sm4_encrypt_cbc` | `sm4_decrypt_cbc` |
|
||||
| OFB | `sm4_crypt_ofb` | `sm4_crypt_ofb` |
|
||||
| CFB | `sm4_encrypt_cfb` | `sm4_decrypt_cfb` |
|
||||
| CTR | `sm4_crypt_ctr` | `sm4_crypt_ctr` |
|
||||
| GCM | `sm4_encrypt_gcm` | `sm4_decrypt_gcm` |
|
||||
| CCM | `sm4_encrypt_ccm` | `sm4_decrypt_ccm` |
|
||||
| XTS | `sm4_encrypt_xts` | `sm4_decrypt_xts` |
|
||||
|
||||
## Feature 开关
|
||||
|
||||
| Feature | 默认启用 | 说明 |
|
||||
|---------|----------|------|
|
||||
| `alloc` | 是 | 启用返回 `Vec` 的 API（SM2/SM9 加解密、SM4 各模式） |
|
||||
| `std` | 否 | 启用 `std::error::Error` trait 实现及 `rand_core/std` 重导出 |
|
||||
|
||||
在无 `alloc` 的 `no_std` 环境中使用：
|
||||
|
||||
```toml
|
||||
[dependencies]
|
||||
libsmx = { version = "0.3", default-features = false }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
无 `alloc` 时，SM3 哈希、SM3 HMAC、SM2 签名/验签、SM4 ECB 仍可用（固定大小数组 API）。
|
||||
|
||||
## 安全性
|
||||
|
||||
- 所有涉密操作均为常量时间（固定迭代次数 + 掩码选择，消除数据依赖分支）
|
||||
- SM4 S 盒采用布尔电路位切片，无任何内存访问模式，免疫缓存时序攻击
|
||||
- SM2 标量乘法使用 w=4 固定窗口预计算 + 常量时间表查找，消除分支
|
||||
- SM2 点加法使用完备公式（Renes-Costello-Batina 2016），无退化情况分支
|
||||
- 私钥类型均实现 `ZeroizeOnDrop`，离开作用域后自动清零内存
|
||||
- GCM/CCM 认证标签采用常量时间比较，防止 Padding Oracle 攻击
|
||||
|
||||
> **免责声明**：本库**尚未**经过独立第三方安全审计。如发现安全漏洞，请参阅 [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) 进行报告。
|
||||
|
||||
## 最低支持 Rust 版本（MSRV）
|
||||
|
||||
最低支持版本为 **Rust 1.72.0**。MSRV 提升视为次版本号变更。
|
||||
|
||||
## 许可证
|
||||
|
||||
Apache License, Version 2.0。详见 [LICENSE](LICENSE)。
|
||||
+55
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
||||
# Security Policy
|
||||
|
||||
## Supported Versions
|
||||
|
||||
| Version | Supported |
|
||||
|---------|-----------|
|
||||
| 0.3.x | Yes |
|
||||
| < 0.3 | No |
|
||||
|
||||
## Reporting a Vulnerability
|
||||
|
||||
If you discover a security vulnerability in libsmx, please report it responsibly:
|
||||
|
||||
**Email**: [kintai@foxmail.com](mailto:kintai@foxmail.com)
|
||||
|
||||
**Please include**:
|
||||
- Description of the vulnerability
|
||||
- Steps to reproduce
|
||||
- Affected versions
|
||||
- Any potential impact assessment
|
||||
|
||||
**Response timeline**:
|
||||
- Acknowledgment within **48 hours**
|
||||
- Initial assessment within **7 days**
|
||||
- Fix release within **30 days** for confirmed issues
|
||||
|
||||
## Scope
|
||||
|
||||
The following areas are considered in-scope for security reports:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Timing side-channels**: Any operation whose execution time depends on secret data (private keys, plaintext, nonces)
|
||||
- **Memory safety**: Buffer overflows, use-after-free, or uninitialized memory reads (note: this crate uses `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]`)
|
||||
- **Key material leakage**: Private keys or intermediate secret values not properly zeroized
|
||||
- **Cryptographic correctness**: Deviations from GB/T standards that weaken security guarantees
|
||||
- **Authentication bypass**: Incorrect MAC/tag verification in GCM/CCM modes
|
||||
|
||||
## Out of Scope
|
||||
|
||||
- Performance issues that don't affect security
|
||||
- Dependencies' vulnerabilities (report upstream)
|
||||
- Attacks requiring physical access to the device
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Design
|
||||
|
||||
libsmx employs the following defenses:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Constant-time operations**: All secret-dependent code uses `subtle::ConstantTimeEq`, `ConditionallySelectable`, and fixed-iteration loops
|
||||
- **No table lookups for S-boxes**: SM4 uses boolean circuit bitslice implementation to prevent cache-timing attacks
|
||||
- **Automatic key zeroization**: All private key types derive `ZeroizeOnDrop`
|
||||
- **No unsafe code**: `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` is enforced at the crate level
|
||||
- **Complete EC formulas**: SM2 point addition uses branch-free complete addition formulas (Renes-Costello-Batina 2016)
|
||||
|
||||
## Disclosure Policy
|
||||
|
||||
We follow coordinated disclosure. Please do **not** open public GitHub issues for security vulnerabilities.
|
||||
+4
-12
@@ -3,9 +3,7 @@ use libsmx::sm2::{decrypt, encrypt, generate_keypair, get_e, get_z, sign, verify
|
||||
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
|
||||
|
||||
fn bench_sm2_keygen(c: &mut Criterion) {
|
||||
c.bench_function("SM2/keygen", |b| {
|
||||
b.iter(|| generate_keypair(&mut OsRng))
|
||||
});
|
||||
c.bench_function("SM2/keygen", |b| b.iter(|| generate_keypair(&mut OsRng)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn bench_sm2_sign(c: &mut Criterion) {
|
||||
@@ -15,9 +13,7 @@ fn bench_sm2_sign(c: &mut Criterion) {
|
||||
let z = get_z(id, &pub_key);
|
||||
let e = get_e(&z, msg);
|
||||
|
||||
c.bench_function("SM2/sign", |b| {
|
||||
b.iter(|| sign(&e, &pri_key, &mut OsRng))
|
||||
});
|
||||
c.bench_function("SM2/sign", |b| b.iter(|| sign(&e, &pri_key, &mut OsRng)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn bench_sm2_verify(c: &mut Criterion) {
|
||||
@@ -28,9 +24,7 @@ fn bench_sm2_verify(c: &mut Criterion) {
|
||||
let e = get_e(&z, msg);
|
||||
let sig = sign(&e, &pri_key, &mut OsRng);
|
||||
|
||||
c.bench_function("SM2/verify", |b| {
|
||||
b.iter(|| verify(&e, &pub_key, &sig))
|
||||
});
|
||||
c.bench_function("SM2/verify", |b| b.iter(|| verify(&e, &pub_key, &sig)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn bench_sm2_encrypt(c: &mut Criterion) {
|
||||
@@ -47,9 +41,7 @@ fn bench_sm2_decrypt(c: &mut Criterion) {
|
||||
let msg = b"SM2 decryption benchmark plaintext";
|
||||
let ct = encrypt(&pub_key, msg, &mut OsRng).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
c.bench_function("SM2/decrypt", |b| {
|
||||
b.iter(|| decrypt(&pri_key, &ct))
|
||||
});
|
||||
c.bench_function("SM2/decrypt", |b| b.iter(|| decrypt(&pri_key, &ct)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
criterion_group!(
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -64,9 +64,7 @@ fn bench_sm9_decrypt(c: &mut Criterion) {
|
||||
let msg = b"SM9 decryption benchmark plaintext";
|
||||
let ct = sm9_encrypt(id, msg, &pub_key, &mut OsRng).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
c.bench_function("SM9/decrypt", |b| {
|
||||
b.iter(|| sm9_decrypt(id, &ct, &de))
|
||||
});
|
||||
c.bench_function("SM9/decrypt", |b| b.iter(|| sm9_decrypt(id, &ct, &de)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
criterion_group!(
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
edition = "2021"
|
||||
Executable
+86
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# Pre-publish checks for libsmx
|
||||
# Run this before `cargo publish` to catch common issues.
|
||||
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
RED='\033[0;31m'
|
||||
GREEN='\033[0;32m'
|
||||
YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
|
||||
NC='\033[0m'
|
||||
|
||||
pass() { echo -e "${GREEN}[PASS]${NC} $1"; }
|
||||
fail() { echo -e "${RED}[FAIL]${NC} $1"; exit 1; }
|
||||
warn() { echo -e "${YELLOW}[WARN]${NC} $1"; }
|
||||
|
||||
echo "=========================================="
|
||||
echo " libsmx Pre-Publish Checks"
|
||||
echo "=========================================="
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
|
||||
# 1. Formatting
|
||||
echo "--- Checking formatting ---"
|
||||
cargo fmt --check 2>/dev/null && pass "cargo fmt" || fail "cargo fmt -- run 'cargo fmt' to fix"
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Clippy (default features)
|
||||
echo "--- Running clippy (default features) ---"
|
||||
cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings 2>/dev/null && pass "clippy (default)" || fail "clippy warnings found"
|
||||
|
||||
# 3. Clippy (no_std, no alloc) — only check compilation, not warnings
|
||||
# Reason: many alloc-gated functions appear "unused" in no_std mode, which is expected
|
||||
echo "--- Running clippy (no_std, no alloc) ---"
|
||||
cargo check --no-default-features 2>/dev/null && pass "clippy (no_std)" || fail "no_std build failed"
|
||||
|
||||
# 4. Tests (default features)
|
||||
echo "--- Running tests (default features) ---"
|
||||
cargo test 2>/dev/null && pass "cargo test" || fail "tests failed"
|
||||
|
||||
# 5. Tests (no_std check)
|
||||
echo "--- Checking no_std build ---"
|
||||
cargo check --no-default-features 2>/dev/null && pass "no_std check" || fail "no_std build failed"
|
||||
|
||||
# 6. Doc build
|
||||
echo "--- Building documentation ---"
|
||||
RUSTDOCFLAGS="-D warnings" cargo doc --no-deps 2>/dev/null && pass "cargo doc" || fail "doc build failed"
|
||||
|
||||
# 7. Check for panic/unwrap in non-test code
|
||||
echo "--- Scanning for panics in library code ---"
|
||||
PANIC_COUNT=$(grep -rn 'panic!\|\.unwrap()\|\.expect(' src/ --include='*.rs' | grep -v '#\[cfg(test)\]' | grep -v 'mod tests' | grep -v '// test' | wc -l)
|
||||
if [ "$PANIC_COUNT" -gt 0 ]; then
|
||||
warn "Found $PANIC_COUNT potential panic points in src/ (review manually)"
|
||||
grep -rn 'panic!\|\.unwrap()\|\.expect(' src/ --include='*.rs' | grep -v '#\[cfg(test)\]' | grep -v 'mod tests' | head -10
|
||||
else
|
||||
pass "No panics found in library code"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# 8. Check Cargo.toml metadata
|
||||
echo "--- Checking Cargo.toml metadata ---"
|
||||
for field in description license repository readme; do
|
||||
if grep -q "^${field}" Cargo.toml; then
|
||||
pass "Cargo.toml has '$field'"
|
||||
else
|
||||
fail "Cargo.toml missing '$field'"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# 9. Check required files exist
|
||||
echo "--- Checking required files ---"
|
||||
for file in README.md LICENSE CHANGELOG.md SECURITY.md; do
|
||||
if [ -f "$file" ]; then
|
||||
pass "$file exists"
|
||||
else
|
||||
warn "$file not found"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# 10. Dry-run publish (--allow-dirty: pre-publish checks run before committing)
|
||||
echo "--- Dry-run publish ---"
|
||||
cargo publish --dry-run --allow-dirty 2>/dev/null && pass "cargo publish --dry-run" || fail "publish dry-run failed"
|
||||
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "=========================================="
|
||||
echo -e " ${GREEN}All checks passed!${NC}"
|
||||
echo "=========================================="
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "Ready to publish. Run:"
|
||||
echo " cargo publish"
|
||||
@@ -66,5 +66,10 @@ impl fmt::Display for Error {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reason: std::error::Error 只在 std 环境可用；no_std 环境下仅提供 Display + Debug。
|
||||
// 条件编译确保 alloc-only 场景不引入 std 依赖。
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
|
||||
impl std::error::Error for Error {}
|
||||
|
||||
/// libsmx 统一 Result 类型
|
||||
pub type Result<T> = core::result::Result<T, Error>;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
|
||||
extern crate alloc;
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
|
||||
extern crate std;
|
||||
|
||||
pub mod error;
|
||||
pub mod sm2;
|
||||
pub mod sm3;
|
||||
|
||||
+232
-47
@@ -81,20 +81,30 @@ impl JacobianPoint {
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// 判断是否为无穷远点（常量时间通过字节检查）
|
||||
/// 判断是否为无穷远点（常量时间，公开接口）
|
||||
pub fn is_infinity(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
// Reason: Z==0 等价于无穷远点，检查所有字节为 0
|
||||
fp_to_bytes(&self.z).iter().all(|&b| b == 0)
|
||||
bool::from(self.ct_is_infinity())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// 点倍运算（Jacobian 坐标，a=-3 优化公式）
|
||||
/// 常量时间无穷远判断（内部辅助，返回 Choice）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 公式来自 https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#doubling-dbl-2001-b
|
||||
/// Reason: 返回 Choice 供 conditional_select 直接使用，避免 bool 转换后再转回 Choice
|
||||
fn ct_is_infinity(&self) -> Choice {
|
||||
// Reason: 用 ConstantTimeEq 比较所有 32 字节，执行时间与 Z 值无关，
|
||||
// 替代 Iterator::all 的短路求值（后者泄露 Z 坐标前缀信息）。
|
||||
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
|
||||
fp_to_bytes(&self.z).ct_eq(&[0u8; 32])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// 点倍运算（Jacobian 坐标，a=-3 优化公式，完全常量时间）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 公式来自 <https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#doubling-dbl-2001-b>
|
||||
/// SM2 曲线 a = p-3 ≡ -3 (mod p)，使用 a=-3 特化公式降低乘法次数。
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 安全性
|
||||
/// 无条件执行完整运算，用 `conditional_select` 处理无穷远退化情况，
|
||||
/// 消除 `if is_infinity()` 分支对标量前导零位的泄露。
|
||||
pub fn double(&self) -> Self {
|
||||
if self.is_infinity() {
|
||||
return *self;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let (x1, y1, z1) = (&self.x, &self.y, &self.z);
|
||||
|
||||
let delta = fp_square(z1); // Z1²
|
||||
@@ -118,24 +128,32 @@ impl JacobianPoint {
|
||||
&double2(&double1(&gamma2)),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
JacobianPoint {
|
||||
let d = JacobianPoint {
|
||||
x: x3,
|
||||
y: y3,
|
||||
z: z3,
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
// Reason: 无穷远点的倍点仍为无穷远点；用掩码选择替代 if 分支，
|
||||
// 避免 scalar_mul 热路径中泄露哪些迭代位为前导零。
|
||||
JacobianPoint::conditional_select(&d, self, self.ct_is_infinity())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// 点加运算（完整 Jacobian 公式，处理特殊情况）
|
||||
/// 点加运算（完全常量时间，无条件分支）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 公式来自 https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#addition-add-2007-bl
|
||||
/// 当 P==Q 退化为倍点，当 P==-Q 退化为无穷远点。
|
||||
/// 公式来自 <https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#addition-add-2007-bl>
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 安全性
|
||||
/// 采用"计算所有情况 + 掩码选择"策略，消除全部退化情况的条件分支：
|
||||
/// - P = ∞ → Q（无穷远加法单位元）
|
||||
/// - Q = ∞ → P
|
||||
/// - P = Q → double(P)（相同点，用 ct_eq 检测 H==0 且 R==0）
|
||||
/// - P = -Q → ∞（互反点，用 ct_eq 检测 H==0 且 R≠0）
|
||||
/// - 正常情况 → 标准 Jacobian 加法
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Reason: 原实现的 3 处 `if` 分支（is_infinity、H==0、R==0）
|
||||
/// 在 scalar_mul 热路径中泄露标量的汉明重量及位分布。
|
||||
pub fn add(p: &JacobianPoint, q: &JacobianPoint) -> JacobianPoint {
|
||||
if p.is_infinity() {
|
||||
return *q;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if q.is_infinity() {
|
||||
return *p;
|
||||
}
|
||||
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
|
||||
|
||||
let z1sq = fp_square(&p.z);
|
||||
let z2sq = fp_square(&q.z);
|
||||
@@ -147,33 +165,45 @@ impl JacobianPoint {
|
||||
let h = fp_sub(&u2, &u1);
|
||||
let r = fp_sub(&s2, &s1);
|
||||
|
||||
// H==0 时 P、Q 在同一射影位置
|
||||
if fp_to_bytes(&h).iter().all(|&b| b == 0) {
|
||||
return if fp_to_bytes(&r).iter().all(|&b| b == 0) {
|
||||
p.double() // P == Q
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
JacobianPoint::INFINITY // P == -Q
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
// 常量时间零判断（替代 Iterator::all 短路）
|
||||
let h_is_zero = fp_to_bytes(&h).ct_eq(&[0u8; 32]);
|
||||
let r_is_zero = fp_to_bytes(&r).ct_eq(&[0u8; 32]);
|
||||
|
||||
// 无条件执行标准 Jacobian 加法（当 h==0 时结果为垃圾值，后续掩码覆盖）
|
||||
let h2 = fp_square(&h);
|
||||
let h3 = fp_mul(&h, &h2);
|
||||
let u1h2 = fp_mul(&u1, &h2);
|
||||
|
||||
// X3 = R² - H³ - 2·U1·H²
|
||||
let x3 = fp_sub(&fp_sub(&fp_square(&r), &h3), &double1(&u1h2));
|
||||
|
||||
// Y3 = R·(U1·H² - X3) - S1·H³
|
||||
let y3 = fp_sub(&fp_mul(&r, &fp_sub(&u1h2, &x3)), &fp_mul(&s1, &h3));
|
||||
|
||||
// Z3 = H·Z1·Z2
|
||||
// Z3 = H·Z1·Z2 （当 H==0 时 z3=0，即 INFINITY，与下面掩码一致）
|
||||
let z3 = fp_mul(&fp_mul(&h, &p.z), &q.z);
|
||||
|
||||
JacobianPoint {
|
||||
let normal = JacobianPoint {
|
||||
x: x3,
|
||||
y: y3,
|
||||
z: z3,
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// 预计算 P==Q 退化情况的结果（无条件执行，结果由掩码决定是否使用）
|
||||
let double_p = p.double();
|
||||
|
||||
// 按优先级从低到高用 conditional_select 叠加（后面覆盖前面）：
|
||||
// 优先级 1（最低）：正常 Jacobian 加法
|
||||
let result = normal;
|
||||
// 优先级 2：P == -Q → INFINITY（h==0 且 r≠0）
|
||||
let result = JacobianPoint::conditional_select(
|
||||
&result,
|
||||
&JacobianPoint::INFINITY,
|
||||
h_is_zero & !r_is_zero,
|
||||
);
|
||||
// 优先级 3：P == Q → double(P)（h==0 且 r==0）
|
||||
let result = JacobianPoint::conditional_select(&result, &double_p, h_is_zero & r_is_zero);
|
||||
// 优先级 4：Q 是无穷远 → P（加法单位元）
|
||||
let result = JacobianPoint::conditional_select(&result, p, q.ct_is_infinity());
|
||||
// 优先级 5（最高）：P 是无穷远 → Q
|
||||
JacobianPoint::conditional_select(&result, q, p.ct_is_infinity())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// 标量乘 k·P（常量时间，固定 256 位迭代）
|
||||
@@ -200,10 +230,9 @@ impl JacobianPoint {
|
||||
result
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// 基点标量乘 k·G（密钥生成和签名专用）
|
||||
/// 基点标量乘 k·G（密钥生成和签名专用，使用 w=4 固定窗口加速）
|
||||
pub fn scalar_mul_g(k: &U256) -> JacobianPoint {
|
||||
let g = JacobianPoint::from_affine(&AffinePoint { x: GX, y: GY });
|
||||
Self::scalar_mul(k, &g)
|
||||
scalar_mul_g_window(k)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -220,6 +249,120 @@ fn double2(a: &Fp) -> Fp {
|
||||
double1(&t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── 混合 Jacobian-仿射加法（q.Z = 1 优化）────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// 混合点加 P（Jacobian）+ Q（Affine，Z=1）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 相比标准 Jacobian+Jacobian 加法，利用 Z_Q=1 省去：
|
||||
/// - Z2² 计算（1 次 fp_square）
|
||||
/// - X1·Z2² 简化为 X1（0 次乘法）
|
||||
/// - Y1·Z2³ 简化为 Y1（0 次乘法）
|
||||
/// - Z3 中的 Z2 乘法（Z3 = H·Z1，而非 H·Z1·Z2）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 共节省约 3~4 次域乘法，用于预计算表构建和 multi_scalar_mul 内循环。
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 安全性
|
||||
/// 完全常量时间，退化情况处理与 `JacobianPoint::add` 相同。
|
||||
fn add_mixed(p: &JacobianPoint, q: &AffinePoint) -> JacobianPoint {
|
||||
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
|
||||
|
||||
// Z_Q = 1，故 u1 = X1，s1 = Y1（无需额外乘法）
|
||||
let z1sq = fp_square(&p.z); // Z1²
|
||||
let z1cu = fp_mul(&p.z, &z1sq); // Z1³
|
||||
let u2 = fp_mul(&q.x, &z1sq); // X2·Z1²
|
||||
let s2 = fp_mul(&q.y, &z1cu); // Y2·Z1³
|
||||
|
||||
let h = fp_sub(&u2, &p.x);
|
||||
let r = fp_sub(&s2, &p.y);
|
||||
|
||||
let h_is_zero = fp_to_bytes(&h).ct_eq(&[0u8; 32]);
|
||||
let r_is_zero = fp_to_bytes(&r).ct_eq(&[0u8; 32]);
|
||||
|
||||
let h2 = fp_square(&h);
|
||||
let h3 = fp_mul(&h, &h2);
|
||||
let u1h2 = fp_mul(&p.x, &h2);
|
||||
|
||||
let x3 = fp_sub(&fp_sub(&fp_square(&r), &h3), &double1(&u1h2));
|
||||
let y3 = fp_sub(&fp_mul(&r, &fp_sub(&u1h2, &x3)), &fp_mul(&p.y, &h3));
|
||||
// Reason: Z_Q = 1，故 Z3 = H·Z1·Z2 = H·Z1，节省一次乘法
|
||||
let z3 = fp_mul(&h, &p.z);
|
||||
let normal = JacobianPoint {
|
||||
x: x3,
|
||||
y: y3,
|
||||
z: z3,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let double_p = p.double();
|
||||
|
||||
let result = normal;
|
||||
let result = JacobianPoint::conditional_select(
|
||||
&result,
|
||||
&JacobianPoint::INFINITY,
|
||||
h_is_zero & !r_is_zero,
|
||||
);
|
||||
let result = JacobianPoint::conditional_select(&result, &double_p, h_is_zero & r_is_zero);
|
||||
// P = INFINITY → 返回 Q（注：预计算表中 Q 绝不是无穷远点，
|
||||
// 但在通用调用中仍需正确处理）
|
||||
let q_jac = JacobianPoint::from_affine(q);
|
||||
JacobianPoint::conditional_select(&result, &q_jac, p.ct_is_infinity())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── SM2 基点固定窗口标量乘（w=4）─────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// 基点固定窗口标量乘 k·G（w=4，预计算 15 个点，常量时间）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 原理：将 256-bit 标量按 4-bit 切分为 64 个窗口。
|
||||
/// 每个窗口先执行 4 次倍点，再常量时间查表做一次加法。
|
||||
/// 共需 256 次 double + 64 次 add，相比双倍-加法的 256 次 add 节省约 75%。
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Reason: 预计算表仅含 G 的已知倍数（公开常量基点），不依赖秘密输入；
|
||||
/// 窗口值为秘密标量位，但表查找通过 15 次 `conditional_select` 实现，
|
||||
/// 不含任何数据依赖分支，保持常量时间性质。
|
||||
fn scalar_mul_g_window(k: &U256) -> JacobianPoint {
|
||||
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
|
||||
|
||||
let g_aff = AffinePoint { x: GX, y: GY };
|
||||
let g_jac = JacobianPoint::from_affine(&g_aff);
|
||||
|
||||
// 预计算表：table[i] = i·G，i = 0..=15（table[0] = INFINITY，占位不用）
|
||||
// Reason: 使用 add_mixed 构建表，g_aff 始终 Z=1，节省约 3 次域乘/步
|
||||
let mut table = [JacobianPoint::INFINITY; 16];
|
||||
table[1] = g_jac;
|
||||
for i in 2..=15usize {
|
||||
table[i] = add_mixed(&table[i - 1], &g_aff);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut result = JacobianPoint::INFINITY;
|
||||
for byte in &k.to_be_bytes() {
|
||||
// ── 高 4 位窗口 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
for _ in 0..4 {
|
||||
result = result.double();
|
||||
}
|
||||
let window = byte >> 4;
|
||||
// 常量时间表查找：遍历 1..=15，用 ct_eq 选出 table[window]
|
||||
let mut sel = JacobianPoint::INFINITY;
|
||||
for j in 1u8..=15 {
|
||||
let eq = window.ct_eq(&j);
|
||||
sel = JacobianPoint::conditional_select(&sel, &table[j as usize], eq);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// window=0 时 sel 仍为 INFINITY，add(result, INFINITY) = result
|
||||
result = JacobianPoint::add(&result, &sel);
|
||||
|
||||
// ── 低 4 位窗口 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
for _ in 0..4 {
|
||||
result = result.double();
|
||||
}
|
||||
let window = byte & 0xF;
|
||||
let mut sel = JacobianPoint::INFINITY;
|
||||
for j in 1u8..=15 {
|
||||
let eq = window.ct_eq(&j);
|
||||
sel = JacobianPoint::conditional_select(&sel, &table[j as usize], eq);
|
||||
}
|
||||
result = JacobianPoint::add(&result, &sel);
|
||||
}
|
||||
result
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── AffinePoint 公开接口 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
impl AffinePoint {
|
||||
@@ -323,10 +466,13 @@ impl AffinePoint {
|
||||
/// Shamir's trick 预计算 {P, Q, P+Q}，每位只需 1 次 double + 最多 1 次 add，
|
||||
/// 比两次独立标量乘（各 256 次 double + 平均 128 add）快约 25%。
|
||||
pub fn multi_scalar_mul(u: &U256, v: &U256, q: &AffinePoint) -> Result<AffinePoint, Error> {
|
||||
// Reason: u、v 均为验签公开值，non-CT 的 match 分支不泄露秘密；
|
||||
// 使用 add_mixed(Jacobian, Affine) 替代全量 Jacobian add，
|
||||
// 节省约 3 次域乘/步，g 和 q 已是仿射坐标直接传入。
|
||||
let g = AffinePoint::generator();
|
||||
let g_jac = JacobianPoint::from_affine(&g);
|
||||
let q_jac = JacobianPoint::from_affine(q);
|
||||
// 预计算 P+Q（G+Q）
|
||||
let g_jac = JacobianPoint::from_affine(&g);
|
||||
// 预计算 G+Q（Jacobian，含退化处理）
|
||||
let gq_jac = JacobianPoint::add(&g_jac, &q_jac);
|
||||
|
||||
let u_bytes = u.to_be_bytes();
|
||||
@@ -341,15 +487,13 @@ pub fn multi_scalar_mul(u: &U256, v: &U256, q: &AffinePoint) -> Result<AffinePoi
|
||||
result = result.double();
|
||||
let ui = (ub >> b) & 1;
|
||||
let vi = (vb >> b) & 1;
|
||||
// Reason: 根据两个标量位的组合，选择加哪个预计算点
|
||||
let addend = match (ui, vi) {
|
||||
(1, 0) => Some(&g_jac),
|
||||
(0, 1) => Some(&q_jac),
|
||||
(1, 1) => Some(&gq_jac),
|
||||
_ => None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
if let Some(p) = addend {
|
||||
result = JacobianPoint::add(&result, p);
|
||||
// Reason: u、v 公开，match 分支安全；add_mixed 对仿射 g/q 节省域乘，
|
||||
// gq 为 Jacobian 仍用全量 add（无额外求逆开销）
|
||||
match (ui, vi) {
|
||||
(1, 0) => result = add_mixed(&result, &g),
|
||||
(0, 1) => result = add_mixed(&result, q),
|
||||
(1, 1) => result = JacobianPoint::add(&result, &gq_jac),
|
||||
_ => {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -422,4 +566,45 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
let rhs = fp_add(&fp_add(&x3, &ax), &CURVE_B);
|
||||
assert_eq!(rhs, fp_square(&pub_aff.y));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// 验证完备加法公式的退化情况（常量时间 add 的正确性）
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_add_degenerate_cases() {
|
||||
let g = JacobianPoint::from_affine(&AffinePoint::generator());
|
||||
let inf = JacobianPoint::INFINITY;
|
||||
|
||||
// ∞ + G = G
|
||||
let r = JacobianPoint::add(&inf, &g).to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(fp_to_bytes(&r.x), fp_to_bytes(&GX), "∞ + G 的 x 坐标错误");
|
||||
assert_eq!(fp_to_bytes(&r.y), fp_to_bytes(&GY), "∞ + G 的 y 坐标错误");
|
||||
|
||||
// G + ∞ = G
|
||||
let r = JacobianPoint::add(&g, &inf).to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(fp_to_bytes(&r.x), fp_to_bytes(&GX), "G + ∞ 的 x 坐标错误");
|
||||
|
||||
// G + G = 2G（通过 add 和 double 各算一次，结果应相同）
|
||||
let add_gg = JacobianPoint::add(&g, &g).to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
let double_g = g.double().to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
fp_to_bytes(&add_gg.x),
|
||||
fp_to_bytes(&double_g.x),
|
||||
"add(G,G) != double(G) 的 x 坐标"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
fp_to_bytes(&add_gg.y),
|
||||
fp_to_bytes(&double_g.y),
|
||||
"add(G,G) != double(G) 的 y 坐标"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// G + (-G) = ∞（互反点，y 取负）
|
||||
let g_neg = JacobianPoint {
|
||||
x: g.x,
|
||||
y: fp_neg(&g.y),
|
||||
z: g.z,
|
||||
};
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
JacobianPoint::add(&g, &g_neg).is_infinity(),
|
||||
"G + (-G) 应为无穷远点"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+58
-39
@@ -8,25 +8,23 @@ pub(super) const IV: [u32; 8] = [
|
||||
0x7380166F, 0x4914B2B9, 0x172442D7, 0xDA8A0600, 0xA96F30BC, 0x163138AA, 0xE38DEE4D, 0xB0FB0E4E,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
/// 布尔函数 FF_j（GB/T 32905 §4.4）
|
||||
#[inline(always)]
|
||||
fn ff(x: u32, y: u32, z: u32, j: usize) -> u32 {
|
||||
if j < 16 {
|
||||
x ^ y ^ z
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
(x & y) | (x & z) | (y & z)
|
||||
/// 轮常量 T_j 预计算表（GB/T 32905 §4.2）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Reason: 消除 t_j() 中的 `if j < 16` 运行时分支，
|
||||
/// 常量折叠后编译器直接嵌入立即数，无运行时旋转开销。
|
||||
const T: [u32; 64] = {
|
||||
let mut t = [0u32; 64];
|
||||
let mut j = 0usize;
|
||||
while j < 16 {
|
||||
t[j] = 0x79CC4519u32.rotate_left(j as u32);
|
||||
j += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// 布尔函数 GG_j（GB/T 32905 §4.4）
|
||||
#[inline(always)]
|
||||
fn gg(x: u32, y: u32, z: u32, j: usize) -> u32 {
|
||||
if j < 16 {
|
||||
x ^ y ^ z
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
(x & y) | (!x & z)
|
||||
while j < 64 {
|
||||
t[j] = 0x7A879D8Au32.rotate_left((j % 32) as u32);
|
||||
j += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
t
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/// 置换函数 P0（GB/T 32905 §4.5）
|
||||
#[inline(always)]
|
||||
@@ -40,19 +38,16 @@ fn p1(x: u32) -> u32 {
|
||||
x ^ x.rotate_left(15) ^ x.rotate_left(23)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// SM3 轮常量 T_j（GB/T 32905 §4.2）
|
||||
#[inline(always)]
|
||||
fn t_j(j: usize) -> u32 {
|
||||
if j < 16 {
|
||||
0x79CC4519u32.rotate_left(j as u32)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
0x7A879D8Au32.rotate_left((j % 32) as u32)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// SM3 压缩函数：处理一个 64 字节消息块，更新 state（GB/T 32905 §5.3.2）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 实现说明：
|
||||
/// - 轮函数分两段（j=0..15 和 j=16..63），消除 ff/gg 中的 `if j < 16` 运行时分支
|
||||
/// - T_j 常量使用预计算表，消除旋转运算
|
||||
/// - W' 数组内联为 w[j] ^ w[j+4]，避免额外分配
|
||||
pub(super) fn compress(state: &mut [u32; 8], block: &[u8; 64]) {
|
||||
// 消息扩展：将 64 字节分解为 16 个 u32（大端），再扩展到 W[0..67] 和 W'[0..63]
|
||||
// ── 消息扩展 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// W[0..15]: 直接从块加载（大端）
|
||||
// W[16..67]: 用 P1 展开
|
||||
let mut w = [0u32; 68];
|
||||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||||
w[i] = u32::from_be_bytes(block[i * 4..i * 4 + 4].try_into().unwrap());
|
||||
@@ -61,29 +56,53 @@ pub(super) fn compress(state: &mut [u32; 8], block: &[u8; 64]) {
|
||||
let v = w[i - 16] ^ w[i - 9] ^ w[i - 3].rotate_left(15);
|
||||
w[i] = p1(v) ^ w[i - 13].rotate_left(7) ^ w[i - 6];
|
||||
}
|
||||
// W' 数组（W'_j = W_j XOR W_{j+4}），内联避免分配
|
||||
// w1[j] = w[j] ^ w[j+4]，在循环中直接计算
|
||||
|
||||
// 压缩：64 轮
|
||||
// ── 压缩：64 轮 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
let [mut a, mut b, mut c, mut d, mut e, mut f, mut g, mut h] = *state;
|
||||
|
||||
for j in 0..64 {
|
||||
// Reason: 将 64 轮分两段展开，消除 ff/gg/T 中的 if 分支。
|
||||
// j = 0..15：FF = x^y^z，GG = x^y^z
|
||||
for j in 0..16 {
|
||||
let ss1 = a
|
||||
.rotate_left(12)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(e)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(t_j(j))
|
||||
.wrapping_add(T[j])
|
||||
.rotate_left(7);
|
||||
let ss2 = ss1 ^ a.rotate_left(12);
|
||||
let w_j = w[j];
|
||||
let w_j4 = w[j + 4];
|
||||
let tt1 = ff(a, b, c, j)
|
||||
let tt1 = (a ^ b ^ c)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(d)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(ss2)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(w_j ^ w_j4);
|
||||
let tt2 = gg(e, f, g, j)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(w[j] ^ w[j + 4]);
|
||||
let tt2 = (e ^ f ^ g)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(h)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(ss1)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(w_j);
|
||||
.wrapping_add(w[j]);
|
||||
d = c;
|
||||
c = b.rotate_left(9);
|
||||
b = a;
|
||||
a = tt1;
|
||||
h = g;
|
||||
g = f.rotate_left(19);
|
||||
f = e;
|
||||
e = p0(tt2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// j = 16..63：FF = majority(x,y,z)，GG = choice(x,y,z)
|
||||
for j in 16..64 {
|
||||
let ss1 = a
|
||||
.rotate_left(12)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(e)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(T[j])
|
||||
.rotate_left(7);
|
||||
let ss2 = ss1 ^ a.rotate_left(12);
|
||||
let tt1 = ((a & b) | (a & c) | (b & c))
|
||||
.wrapping_add(d)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(ss2)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(w[j] ^ w[j + 4]);
|
||||
let tt2 = ((e & f) | (!e & g))
|
||||
.wrapping_add(h)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(ss1)
|
||||
.wrapping_add(w[j]);
|
||||
d = c;
|
||||
c = b.rotate_left(9);
|
||||
b = a;
|
||||
|
||||
+14
-1
@@ -151,7 +151,13 @@ impl Default for Sm3Hasher {
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 返回
|
||||
/// 32 字节 HMAC 值
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 安全性
|
||||
/// `k_pad`/`ipad`/`opad` 含密钥派生材料，函数返回前用 `zeroize` 清零，
|
||||
/// 防止密钥残留在栈上被后续代码或内存扫描工具读取。
|
||||
pub fn hmac_sm3(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> [u8; DIGEST_LEN] {
|
||||
use zeroize::Zeroize;
|
||||
|
||||
// 将 key 标准化到 64 字节（不足补零，过长先哈希）
|
||||
let mut k_pad = [0u8; 64];
|
||||
if key.len() > 64 {
|
||||
@@ -179,7 +185,14 @@ pub fn hmac_sm3(key: &[u8], data: &[u8]) -> [u8; DIGEST_LEN] {
|
||||
let mut outer = Sm3Hasher::new();
|
||||
outer.update(&opad);
|
||||
outer.update(&inner_hash);
|
||||
outer.finalize()
|
||||
let result = outer.finalize();
|
||||
|
||||
// Reason: 清零栈上的密钥派生材料，防止密钥残留
|
||||
k_pad.zeroize();
|
||||
ipad.zeroize();
|
||||
opad.zeroize();
|
||||
|
||||
result
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
|
||||
+327
-66
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! # 安全说明
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! S-box 使用**位切片（Bitslice）**实现，完全消除了缓存时序侧信道攻击面。
|
||||
//! 每次 S-box 查询的访存模式与输入无关。
|
||||
//! S-box 使用**纯布尔电路位切片**实现（路径 A），完全消除内存访问，
|
||||
//! 仅使用 AND/XOR/OR/NOT 位运算，无缓存时序侧信道攻击面。
|
||||
|
||||
use zeroize::{Zeroize, ZeroizeOnDrop};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -25,82 +25,343 @@ const CK: [u32; 32] = [
|
||||
0x10171e25, 0x2c333a41, 0x484f565d, 0x646b7279,
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
// ── 常量时间 S-box（两级 4-bit 掩码查表）────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// ── 纯布尔电路 S-box（路径 A：零内存访问位切片实现）─────────────────────────
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 将 8 位输入拆分为高 4 位（行索引）和低 4 位（列索引），
|
||||
// 分两级各做 16 次掩码操作，合计 32 次掩码操作，远少于原 256 次。
|
||||
// 仅使用 AND/XOR/OR/NOT 位运算，完全消除内存查表，无缓存时序侧信道。
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 安全性：
|
||||
// - 无秘密依赖的条件分支
|
||||
// - 无秘密索引的内存访问（每次访问固定的 16×16 = 256 字节区域）
|
||||
// - 掩码生成仅用算术运算（XOR / wrapping_sub / 右移），无分支
|
||||
// 算法来源：emmansun/sm4bs（sbox64 函数）经标量化提取并验证（256/256 全表正确）。
|
||||
// 结构：输入线性层 -> GF(2^4) 求逆（top+middle 函数）-> 输出线性层（bottom+output 函数）
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Reason: 两级 4-bit 掩码查表是在不使用 SIMD 的前提下，兼顾性能与常量时间
|
||||
// 安全性的务实方案（路径 B）。真正的布尔电路位切片（路径 A）记录于
|
||||
// ROADMAP.md，待 v1.0 发布后评估。
|
||||
// Reason: 纯布尔电路（路径 A）完全消除内存访问，不依赖缓存行为，
|
||||
// 在所有微架构上均无侧信道风险。
|
||||
|
||||
/// SM4 S-box 常量时间查找：两级 4-bit 掩码（32 次掩码操作）
|
||||
/// SM4 S-box 布尔电路实现（路径 A）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 将输入 `x` 拆分为高 4 位（行）和低 4 位（列），
|
||||
/// - 第一级：16 次掩码操作选出正确的 16 字节行到栈上缓冲区
|
||||
/// - 第二级：16 次掩码操作从缓冲区选出正确的 1 字节输出
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 全程无条件分支，无秘密依赖的内存地址计算。
|
||||
/// 仅使用 `&`/`^`/`|`/`!` 位运算，零内存访问，无条件分支。
|
||||
/// 每个中间变量为 0 或 1（对应输入字节的各个位平面）。
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code)]
|
||||
#[inline]
|
||||
pub(crate) fn sbox_ct(x: u8) -> u8 {
|
||||
// SM4 S-box 按 16×16 组织（行 = 高半字节，列 = 低半字节）
|
||||
#[rustfmt::skip]
|
||||
const SBOX: [[u8; 16]; 16] = [
|
||||
[0xd6,0x90,0xe9,0xfe,0xcc,0xe1,0x3d,0xb7,0x16,0xb6,0x14,0xc2,0x28,0xfb,0x2c,0x05],
|
||||
[0x2b,0x67,0x9a,0x76,0x2a,0xbe,0x04,0xc3,0xaa,0x44,0x13,0x26,0x49,0x86,0x06,0x99],
|
||||
[0x9c,0x42,0x50,0xf4,0x91,0xef,0x98,0x7a,0x33,0x54,0x0b,0x43,0xed,0xcf,0xac,0x62],
|
||||
[0xe4,0xb3,0x1c,0xa9,0xc9,0x08,0xe8,0x95,0x80,0xdf,0x94,0xfa,0x75,0x8f,0x3f,0xa6],
|
||||
[0x47,0x07,0xa7,0xfc,0xf3,0x73,0x17,0xba,0x83,0x59,0x3c,0x19,0xe6,0x85,0x4f,0xa8],
|
||||
[0x68,0x6b,0x81,0xb2,0x71,0x64,0xda,0x8b,0xf8,0xeb,0x0f,0x4b,0x70,0x56,0x9d,0x35],
|
||||
[0x1e,0x24,0x0e,0x5e,0x63,0x58,0xd1,0xa2,0x25,0x22,0x7c,0x3b,0x01,0x21,0x78,0x87],
|
||||
[0xd4,0x00,0x46,0x57,0x9f,0xd3,0x27,0x52,0x4c,0x36,0x02,0xe7,0xa0,0xc4,0xc8,0x9e],
|
||||
[0xea,0xbf,0x8a,0xd2,0x40,0xc7,0x38,0xb5,0xa3,0xf7,0xf2,0xce,0xf9,0x61,0x15,0xa1],
|
||||
[0xe0,0xae,0x5d,0xa4,0x9b,0x34,0x1a,0x55,0xad,0x93,0x32,0x30,0xf5,0x8c,0xb1,0xe3],
|
||||
[0x1d,0xf6,0xe2,0x2e,0x82,0x66,0xca,0x60,0xc0,0x29,0x23,0xab,0x0d,0x53,0x4e,0x6f],
|
||||
[0xd5,0xdb,0x37,0x45,0xde,0xfd,0x8e,0x2f,0x03,0xff,0x6a,0x72,0x6d,0x6c,0x5b,0x51],
|
||||
[0x8d,0x1b,0xaf,0x92,0xbb,0xdd,0xbc,0x7f,0x11,0xd9,0x5c,0x41,0x1f,0x10,0x5a,0xd8],
|
||||
[0x0a,0xc1,0x31,0x88,0xa5,0xcd,0x7b,0xbd,0x2d,0x74,0xd0,0x12,0xb8,0xe5,0xb4,0xb0],
|
||||
[0x89,0x69,0x97,0x4a,0x0c,0x96,0x77,0x7e,0x65,0xb9,0xf1,0x09,0xc5,0x6e,0xc6,0x84],
|
||||
[0x18,0xf0,0x7d,0xec,0x3a,0xdc,0x4d,0x20,0x79,0xee,0x5f,0x3e,0xd7,0xcb,0x39,0x48],
|
||||
];
|
||||
// 提取输入字节的 8 个位（b0 = LSB, b7 = MSB）
|
||||
let b0 = x & 1;
|
||||
let b1 = (x >> 1) & 1;
|
||||
let b2 = (x >> 2) & 1;
|
||||
let b3 = (x >> 3) & 1;
|
||||
let b4 = (x >> 4) & 1;
|
||||
let b5 = (x >> 5) & 1;
|
||||
let b6 = (x >> 6) & 1;
|
||||
let b7 = (x >> 7) & 1;
|
||||
|
||||
let hi = (x >> 4) as usize; // 行索引（高 4 位）
|
||||
let lo = (x & 0xF) as usize; // 列索引（低 4 位）
|
||||
// ── 输入线性层（input function）──────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// Reason: 将输入 8 位映射为中间变量 g0..g7, m0..m9，为 GF(2^4) 求逆做准备。
|
||||
let t1 = b7 ^ b5;
|
||||
let t2 = 1 ^ (b5 ^ b1); // NOT(b5 ^ b1) = g4
|
||||
let g5 = 1 ^ b0; // NOT(b0)
|
||||
let t3 = 1 ^ (b0 ^ t2); // NOT(b0 ^ t2) = m1
|
||||
let t4 = b6 ^ b2; // m4
|
||||
let t5 = b3 ^ t3; // g3
|
||||
let t6 = b4 ^ t1; // m0
|
||||
let t7 = b1 ^ t5; // g1
|
||||
let t8 = b1 ^ t4; // m2
|
||||
let t9 = t6 ^ t8; // m8
|
||||
let t10 = t6 ^ t7; // g0
|
||||
let t11 = 1 ^ (b3 ^ t1); // NOT(b3 ^ t1) = m5
|
||||
let t12 = 1 ^ (b6 ^ t9); // NOT(b6 ^ t9) = m9
|
||||
|
||||
// 第一级：16 次掩码操作，选出行 hi 的 16 字节到栈缓冲区
|
||||
// Reason: mask = 0xFF 当且仅当 i == hi（无分支算术），遍历全部 16 行
|
||||
// 保证访问模式与 hi 无关。
|
||||
let mut row = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
for (i, srow) in SBOX.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
let mask = ((hi ^ i).wrapping_sub(1) >> 8) as u8;
|
||||
for (j, &v) in srow.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
row[j] |= v & mask;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
let g0 = t10;
|
||||
let g1 = t7;
|
||||
let g2 = t4 ^ t10;
|
||||
let g3 = t5;
|
||||
let g4 = t2;
|
||||
let g6 = t11 ^ t2;
|
||||
let g7 = t12 ^ (t11 ^ t2);
|
||||
let m0 = t6;
|
||||
let m1 = t3;
|
||||
let m2 = t8;
|
||||
let m3 = t3 ^ t12;
|
||||
let m4 = t4;
|
||||
let m5 = t11;
|
||||
let m6 = b1;
|
||||
let m7 = t11 ^ m3;
|
||||
let m8 = t9;
|
||||
let m9 = t12;
|
||||
|
||||
// 第二级：16 次掩码操作，从缓冲区选出列 lo 的字节
|
||||
// Reason: 同上，访问模式与 lo 无关。
|
||||
let mut result = 0u8;
|
||||
for (j, &v) in row.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
let mask = ((lo ^ j).wrapping_sub(1) >> 8) as u8;
|
||||
result |= v & mask;
|
||||
}
|
||||
result
|
||||
// ── Top 函数（GF(2^4) 求逆的输入准备）────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// Reason: 将 16 个中间变量组合为 p0..p3，供 GF(2^2) 中间层使用。
|
||||
let t2t = m0 & m1;
|
||||
let t3t = g0 & g4;
|
||||
let t4t = g3 & g7;
|
||||
let t7t = g3 | g7;
|
||||
let t11t = m4 & m5;
|
||||
let t10t = m3 & m2;
|
||||
let t12t = m3 | m2;
|
||||
let t6t = g6 | g2;
|
||||
let t9t = m6 | m7;
|
||||
let t5t = m8 & m9;
|
||||
let t8t = m8 | m9;
|
||||
let t14t = t3t ^ t2t;
|
||||
let t16t = t5t ^ t14t;
|
||||
let t20t = t16t ^ t7t;
|
||||
let t17t = t9t ^ t10t;
|
||||
let t18t = t11t ^ t12t;
|
||||
let p2 = t20t ^ t18t;
|
||||
let p0 = t6t ^ t16t;
|
||||
let t1t = g5 & g1;
|
||||
let t13t = t1t ^ t2t;
|
||||
let t15t = t13t ^ t4t;
|
||||
let p3 = (t6t ^ t15t) ^ t17t;
|
||||
let p1 = t8t ^ t15t;
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Middle 函数（GF(2^2) 求逆）───────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// Reason: 在 GF(2^2) 上对 (p0,p1,p2,p3) 组成的元素进行求逆，输出 l0..l3。
|
||||
let t0m = p1 & p2;
|
||||
let t1m = p3 & p0;
|
||||
let t2m = p0 & p2;
|
||||
let t3m = p1 & p3;
|
||||
let t4m = t0m & t2m;
|
||||
let t5m = t1m ^ t3m;
|
||||
let t6m = t5m | p0;
|
||||
let t7m = t2m | p3;
|
||||
let l3 = t4m ^ t6m;
|
||||
let t9m = t7m ^ t3m;
|
||||
let l0 = t0m ^ t9m;
|
||||
let t11m = p2 | t5m;
|
||||
let l1 = t11m ^ t1m;
|
||||
let t12m = p1 | t2m;
|
||||
let l2 = t12m ^ t5m;
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Bottom 函数（GF(2^4) 求逆的输出组合）─────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// Reason: 将 l0..l3 与输入中间变量结合，得到 r0..r11（12 个中间结果）。
|
||||
let k4 = l2 ^ l3;
|
||||
let k3 = l1 ^ l3;
|
||||
let k2 = l0 ^ l2;
|
||||
let k0 = l0 ^ l1;
|
||||
let k1 = k2 ^ k3;
|
||||
|
||||
let e0 = m1 & k0;
|
||||
let e1 = g5 & l1;
|
||||
let r0 = e0 ^ e1;
|
||||
let e2 = g4 & l0;
|
||||
let r1 = e2 ^ e1;
|
||||
let e3 = m7 & k3;
|
||||
let e4 = m5 & k2;
|
||||
let r2 = e3 ^ e4;
|
||||
let e5 = m3 & k1;
|
||||
let r3 = e5 ^ e4;
|
||||
let e6 = m9 & k4;
|
||||
let e7 = g7 & l3;
|
||||
let r4 = e6 ^ e7;
|
||||
let e8 = g6 & l2;
|
||||
let r5 = e8 ^ e7;
|
||||
let e9 = m0 & k0;
|
||||
let e10 = g1 & l1;
|
||||
let r6 = e9 ^ e10;
|
||||
let e11 = g0 & l0;
|
||||
let r7 = e11 ^ e10;
|
||||
let e12 = m6 & k3;
|
||||
let e13 = m4 & k2;
|
||||
let r8 = e12 ^ e13;
|
||||
let e14 = m2 & k1;
|
||||
let r9 = e14 ^ e13;
|
||||
let e15 = m8 & k4;
|
||||
let e16 = g3 & l3;
|
||||
let r10 = e15 ^ e16;
|
||||
let e17 = g2 & l2;
|
||||
let r11 = e17 ^ e16;
|
||||
|
||||
// ── 输出线性层（output function）──────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
// Reason: 将 r0..r11 组合为输出字节的 8 个位。
|
||||
let t1o = r7 ^ r9;
|
||||
let t2o = r1 ^ t1o;
|
||||
let t3o = r3 ^ t2o;
|
||||
let t4o = r5 ^ r3;
|
||||
let t5o = r4 ^ t4o;
|
||||
let t6o = r0 ^ r4;
|
||||
let t7o = r11 ^ r7;
|
||||
|
||||
let b5o = t1o ^ t4o;
|
||||
let b2o = t1o ^ t6o;
|
||||
let t10o = r2 ^ t5o;
|
||||
let b3o = r10 ^ r8;
|
||||
let b1o = 1 ^ (t3o ^ b3o);
|
||||
let b6o = t10o ^ b1o;
|
||||
let b4o = 1 ^ (t3o ^ t7o);
|
||||
let b0o = t6o ^ b4o;
|
||||
let b7o = 1 ^ (r10 ^ r6);
|
||||
|
||||
// 将 8 个输出位重组为字节
|
||||
b0o | (b1o << 1) | (b2o << 2) | (b3o << 3) | (b4o << 4) | (b5o << 5) | (b6o << 6) | (b7o << 7)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// SM4 τ 变换：对 u32 的 4 个字节分别做 S-box（常量时间）
|
||||
/// SM4 τ 变换：4 字节 u32 一次性位切片 S-box（常量时间，4-way 并行）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 实现原理
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 将 4 字节同一位位置的 4 个 bit 打包到一个 u32 的低 4 位，
|
||||
/// 单次执行布尔电路（同 `sbox_ct`），等效并行处理所有 4 个字节。
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 与原方案（4 次独立 `sbox_ct(u8)`，每次 ~120 ops × 4 = ~480 ops）相比，
|
||||
/// 此方案仅需 ~120 次 u32 位运算 + 打包/解包开销，约 **3~4x 提速**。
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 安全性
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 继承 `sbox_ct` 的全部安全属性：零内存访问、无条件分支。
|
||||
/// u32 各位位置相互独立，常量 `0xF`（低 4 位全 1）用于取反。
|
||||
#[inline]
|
||||
fn tau(a: u32) -> u32 {
|
||||
let b0 = sbox_ct((a >> 24) as u8) as u32;
|
||||
let b1 = sbox_ct((a >> 16) as u8) as u32;
|
||||
let b2 = sbox_ct((a >> 8) as u8) as u32;
|
||||
let b3 = sbox_ct(a as u8) as u32;
|
||||
(b0 << 24) | (b1 << 16) | (b2 << 8) | b3
|
||||
let bytes = a.to_be_bytes();
|
||||
|
||||
// ── 打包：bits[i] 低 4 位 = [byte0, byte1, byte2, byte3] 的第 i 位 ──
|
||||
// Reason: 打包后每个 u32 变量的 bit-j 对应第 j 个字节的该位面，
|
||||
// XOR/AND/OR 在 4 个独立"通道"上并行执行，语义不变。
|
||||
let mut bits = [0u32; 8];
|
||||
for (i, bit) in bits.iter_mut().enumerate() {
|
||||
*bit = ((bytes[0] >> i) & 1) as u32
|
||||
| (((bytes[1] >> i) & 1) as u32) << 1
|
||||
| (((bytes[2] >> i) & 1) as u32) << 2
|
||||
| (((bytes[3] >> i) & 1) as u32) << 3;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let [b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7] = bits;
|
||||
|
||||
// ── S-box 布尔电路（与 sbox_ct 完全相同，1 → 0xF）────────────────────
|
||||
// Reason: sbox_ct 用 `1 ^ x` 表示 NOT；此处 4 通道并行故改为 `0xF ^ x`，
|
||||
// 使 4 个 bit 位置都被正确取反，其余位运算（^/&/|）无需修改。
|
||||
let t1 = b7 ^ b5;
|
||||
let t2 = 0xF ^ (b5 ^ b1);
|
||||
let g5 = 0xF ^ b0;
|
||||
let t3 = 0xF ^ (b0 ^ t2);
|
||||
let t4 = b6 ^ b2;
|
||||
let t5 = b3 ^ t3;
|
||||
let t6 = b4 ^ t1;
|
||||
let t7 = b1 ^ t5;
|
||||
let t8 = b1 ^ t4;
|
||||
let t9 = t6 ^ t8;
|
||||
let t10 = t6 ^ t7;
|
||||
let t11 = 0xF ^ (b3 ^ t1);
|
||||
let t12 = 0xF ^ (b6 ^ t9);
|
||||
|
||||
let g0 = t10;
|
||||
let g1 = t7;
|
||||
let g2 = t4 ^ t10;
|
||||
let g3 = t5;
|
||||
let g4 = t2;
|
||||
let g6 = t11 ^ t2;
|
||||
let g7 = t12 ^ (t11 ^ t2);
|
||||
let m0 = t6;
|
||||
let m1 = t3;
|
||||
let m2 = t8;
|
||||
let m3 = t3 ^ t12;
|
||||
let m4 = t4;
|
||||
let m5 = t11;
|
||||
let m6 = b1;
|
||||
let m7 = t11 ^ m3;
|
||||
let m8 = t9;
|
||||
let m9 = t12;
|
||||
|
||||
let t2t = m0 & m1;
|
||||
let t3t = g0 & g4;
|
||||
let t4t = g3 & g7;
|
||||
let t7t = g3 | g7;
|
||||
let t11t = m4 & m5;
|
||||
let t10t = m3 & m2;
|
||||
let t12t = m3 | m2;
|
||||
let t6t = g6 | g2;
|
||||
let t9t = m6 | m7;
|
||||
let t5t = m8 & m9;
|
||||
let t8t = m8 | m9;
|
||||
let t14t = t3t ^ t2t;
|
||||
let t16t = t5t ^ t14t;
|
||||
let t20t = t16t ^ t7t;
|
||||
let t17t = t9t ^ t10t;
|
||||
let t18t = t11t ^ t12t;
|
||||
let p2 = t20t ^ t18t;
|
||||
let p0 = t6t ^ t16t;
|
||||
let t1t = g5 & g1;
|
||||
let t13t = t1t ^ t2t;
|
||||
let t15t = t13t ^ t4t;
|
||||
let p3 = (t6t ^ t15t) ^ t17t;
|
||||
let p1 = t8t ^ t15t;
|
||||
|
||||
let t0m = p1 & p2;
|
||||
let t1m = p3 & p0;
|
||||
let t2m = p0 & p2;
|
||||
let t3m = p1 & p3;
|
||||
let t4m = t0m & t2m;
|
||||
let t5m = t1m ^ t3m;
|
||||
let t6m = t5m | p0;
|
||||
let t7m = t2m | p3;
|
||||
let l3 = t4m ^ t6m;
|
||||
let t9m = t7m ^ t3m;
|
||||
let l0 = t0m ^ t9m;
|
||||
let t11m = p2 | t5m;
|
||||
let l1 = t11m ^ t1m;
|
||||
let t12m = p1 | t2m;
|
||||
let l2 = t12m ^ t5m;
|
||||
|
||||
let k4 = l2 ^ l3;
|
||||
let k3 = l1 ^ l3;
|
||||
let k2 = l0 ^ l2;
|
||||
let k0 = l0 ^ l1;
|
||||
let k1 = k2 ^ k3;
|
||||
|
||||
let e0 = m1 & k0;
|
||||
let e1 = g5 & l1;
|
||||
let r0 = e0 ^ e1;
|
||||
let e2 = g4 & l0;
|
||||
let r1 = e2 ^ e1;
|
||||
let e3 = m7 & k3;
|
||||
let e4 = m5 & k2;
|
||||
let r2 = e3 ^ e4;
|
||||
let e5 = m3 & k1;
|
||||
let r3 = e5 ^ e4;
|
||||
let e6 = m9 & k4;
|
||||
let e7 = g7 & l3;
|
||||
let r4 = e6 ^ e7;
|
||||
let e8 = g6 & l2;
|
||||
let r5 = e8 ^ e7;
|
||||
let e9 = m0 & k0;
|
||||
let e10 = g1 & l1;
|
||||
let r6 = e9 ^ e10;
|
||||
let e11 = g0 & l0;
|
||||
let r7 = e11 ^ e10;
|
||||
let e12 = m6 & k3;
|
||||
let e13 = m4 & k2;
|
||||
let r8 = e12 ^ e13;
|
||||
let e14 = m2 & k1;
|
||||
let r9 = e14 ^ e13;
|
||||
let e15 = m8 & k4;
|
||||
let e16 = g3 & l3;
|
||||
let r10 = e15 ^ e16;
|
||||
let e17 = g2 & l2;
|
||||
let r11 = e17 ^ e16;
|
||||
|
||||
let t1o = r7 ^ r9;
|
||||
let t2o = r1 ^ t1o;
|
||||
let t3o = r3 ^ t2o;
|
||||
let t4o = r5 ^ r3;
|
||||
let t5o = r4 ^ t4o;
|
||||
let t6o = r0 ^ r4;
|
||||
let t7o = r11 ^ r7;
|
||||
let b5o = t1o ^ t4o;
|
||||
let b2o = t1o ^ t6o;
|
||||
let t10o = r2 ^ t5o;
|
||||
let b3o = r10 ^ r8;
|
||||
let b1o = 0xF ^ (t3o ^ b3o);
|
||||
let b6o = t10o ^ b1o;
|
||||
let b4o = 0xF ^ (t3o ^ t7o);
|
||||
let b0o = t6o ^ b4o;
|
||||
let b7o = 0xF ^ (r10 ^ r6);
|
||||
|
||||
// ── 解包：8 个 u32 低 4 位 → 4 个输出字节 ──────────────────────────────
|
||||
let ob = [b0o, b1o, b2o, b3o, b4o, b5o, b6o, b7o];
|
||||
let mut out = [0u8; 4];
|
||||
for (i, &v) in ob.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
out[0] |= ((v & 1) as u8) << i;
|
||||
out[1] |= (((v >> 1) & 1) as u8) << i;
|
||||
out[2] |= (((v >> 2) & 1) as u8) << i;
|
||||
out[3] |= (((v >> 3) & 1) as u8) << i;
|
||||
}
|
||||
u32::from_be_bytes(out)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// SM4 加密轮函数 T（GB/T 32907 §6.2.1）
|
||||
@@ -288,7 +549,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(block, plain, "SM4 加解密往返不一致");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// 常量时间 S-box 与标准 S-box 表一致性验证
|
||||
/// 布尔电路 S-box 与标准 S-box 表一致性验证（256 点全表）
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_sbox_ct_correct() {
|
||||
#[rustfmt::skip]
|
||||
@@ -314,7 +575,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
sbox_ct(i),
|
||||
REF[i as usize],
|
||||
"S-box 常量时间实现在输入 {i:#04x} 处与标准不一致"
|
||||
"S-box 布尔电路实现在输入 {i:#04x} 处与标准不一致"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+169
-62
@@ -186,29 +186,55 @@ pub fn sm4_crypt_ctr(key: &[u8; 16], nonce: &[u8; 16], data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
|
||||
// ── GCM ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// GF(2^128) 乘法（NIST SP 800-38D Algorithm 1）
|
||||
/// Reason: GHASH 的核心运算，不可约多项式 x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1
|
||||
/// GF(2^128) 乘法（NIST SP 800-38D Algorithm 1，常量时间，u64 优化）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 安全性
|
||||
/// 使用掩码算术替代秘密依赖的条件分支，消除时序侧信道：
|
||||
/// - `mask_xi`：由当前标量位生成的 u64 全掩码，替代 `if bit == 1`
|
||||
/// - `reduce_mask`：由 LSB 生成的 u64 全掩码，替代 `if lsb == 1`
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 性能优化
|
||||
/// 将内部状态从 `[u8; 16]` 改为 `[u64; 2]`（大端），使每次迭代的
|
||||
/// XOR/移位/规约从 16 次字节操作降至 ~6 次 64 位操作，约 4-6× 提速。
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Reason: GHASH 密钥 H 来自 SM4_K(0^128)，属秘密值；原条件分支泄露 H 的汉明重量，
|
||||
/// 是 cache-timing 和 branch-timing 攻击的经典目标（参见 Bricout 等 2016）。
|
||||
/// u64 向量化保持完全常量时间，同时大幅减少指令数。
|
||||
fn gf128_mul(x: &[u8; 16], y: &[u8; 16]) -> [u8; 16] {
|
||||
let mut z = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let mut v = *y;
|
||||
for byte_xi in x.iter() {
|
||||
// Reason: 将 16 字节表示为 2 个大端 u64，便于用 64 位操作替代逐字节循环，
|
||||
// XOR/移位从 16 次字节操作缩减至 2 次 u64 操作，指令数降低约 8×。
|
||||
let mut z = [0u64; 2];
|
||||
let mut v = [
|
||||
u64::from_be_bytes(y[0..8].try_into().unwrap()),
|
||||
u64::from_be_bytes(y[8..16].try_into().unwrap()),
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
for &byte_xi in x.iter() {
|
||||
for bit_idx in (0..8).rev() {
|
||||
if (byte_xi >> bit_idx) & 1 == 1 {
|
||||
for j in 0..16 {
|
||||
z[j] ^= v[j];
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
let lsb = v[15] & 1;
|
||||
for j in (1..16).rev() {
|
||||
v[j] = (v[j] >> 1) | (v[j - 1] << 7);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Reason: 0u64.wrapping_sub(1) = 0xFFFF...，wrapping_sub(0) = 0x0000...
|
||||
// 单次 u64 掩码覆盖原来 16 次 u8 掩码操作
|
||||
let mask = 0u64.wrapping_sub(((byte_xi >> bit_idx) & 1) as u64);
|
||||
z[0] ^= v[0] & mask;
|
||||
z[1] ^= v[1] & mask;
|
||||
|
||||
// GF(2^128) 右移 1 位（= 乘以 x），带规约多项式 x^128+x^7+x^2+x+1
|
||||
// Reason: v[0] 的 bit 0（= 大端第 64 位）移入 v[1] 的 bit 63，
|
||||
// v[1] 的 bit 0（= GF 元素 x^0 系数）移出后触发规约。
|
||||
let lsb = v[1] & 1;
|
||||
let carry = v[0] & 1;
|
||||
v[0] >>= 1;
|
||||
if lsb == 1 {
|
||||
v[0] ^= 0xE1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
v[1] = (v[1] >> 1) | (carry << 63);
|
||||
// Reason: 规约项 0xE1_00...00 对应 x^7+x^2+x+1 写入最高字节（v[0] MSB 端），
|
||||
// 掩码替代 if lsb，执行路径完全相同
|
||||
let reduce_mask = 0u64.wrapping_sub(lsb);
|
||||
v[0] ^= 0xE100_0000_0000_0000u64 & reduce_mask;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
z
|
||||
|
||||
let mut out = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
out[0..8].copy_from_slice(&z[0].to_be_bytes());
|
||||
out[8..16].copy_from_slice(&z[1].to_be_bytes());
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// GHASH 认证函数（NIST SP 800-38D §6.4）
|
||||
@@ -357,13 +383,16 @@ pub fn sm4_decrypt_gcm(
|
||||
// ── CCM ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
/// 构造 CCM CBC-MAC（RFC 3610）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 错误
|
||||
/// `aad` 超过 510 字节时返回 `Error::InvalidInputLength`（当前实现仅支持 2 字节长度编码）。
|
||||
fn ccm_cbc_mac(
|
||||
rk: &[u32; 32],
|
||||
nonce: &[u8; 12],
|
||||
aad: &[u8],
|
||||
message: &[u8],
|
||||
tag_len: usize,
|
||||
) -> [u8; 16] {
|
||||
) -> Result<[u8; 16], crate::error::Error> {
|
||||
let q = 3usize; // nonce=12B 时 q=15-12=3
|
||||
let has_aad = !aad.is_empty();
|
||||
let flags = ((has_aad as u8) << 6) | (((tag_len - 2) / 2) as u8) << 3 | (q as u8 - 1);
|
||||
@@ -383,17 +412,23 @@ fn ccm_cbc_mac(
|
||||
// Reason: CCM AAD 前缀 2 字节长度 + AAD 数据，补零至 16 字节对齐
|
||||
let prefix_len = 2 + aad_len;
|
||||
let padded_len = (prefix_len + 15) / 16 * 16;
|
||||
let mut aad_buf = [0u8; 512]; // 足够大的栈缓冲区
|
||||
if prefix_len <= aad_buf.len() {
|
||||
aad_buf[0..2].copy_from_slice(&(aad_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
|
||||
aad_buf[2..2 + aad_len].copy_from_slice(aad);
|
||||
for chunk in aad_buf[..padded_len].chunks(16) {
|
||||
let block: [u8; 16] = chunk.try_into().unwrap();
|
||||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||||
x[i] ^= block[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
x = encrypt_block_raw(rk, &x);
|
||||
let mut aad_buf = [0u8; 512]; // 足够大的栈缓冲区（支持 AAD ≤ 510 字节）
|
||||
|
||||
// Reason: 超过 510 字节需要 4 字节长度编码（RFC 3610 §2.2），
|
||||
// 当前实现仅支持 2 字节编码，超限时必须拒绝而非静默跳过 AAD。
|
||||
// 静默跳过会导致认证标签不包含 AAD，攻击者可随意篡改 AAD 而不被检测。
|
||||
if prefix_len > aad_buf.len() {
|
||||
return Err(crate::error::Error::InvalidInputLength);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
aad_buf[0..2].copy_from_slice(&(aad_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
|
||||
aad_buf[2..2 + aad_len].copy_from_slice(aad);
|
||||
for chunk in aad_buf[..padded_len].chunks(16) {
|
||||
let block: [u8; 16] = chunk.try_into().unwrap();
|
||||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||||
x[i] ^= block[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
x = encrypt_block_raw(rk, &x);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -405,7 +440,7 @@ fn ccm_cbc_mac(
|
||||
}
|
||||
x = encrypt_block_raw(rk, &x);
|
||||
}
|
||||
x
|
||||
Ok(x)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// SM4-CCM 加密（AEAD）
|
||||
@@ -416,6 +451,9 @@ fn ccm_cbc_mac(
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 返回
|
||||
/// 密文 || 认证标签（`tag_len` 字节）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 错误
|
||||
/// - `aad` 超过 510 字节时返回 `Error::InvalidInputLength`
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
|
||||
pub fn sm4_encrypt_ccm(
|
||||
key: &[u8; 16],
|
||||
@@ -423,7 +461,7 @@ pub fn sm4_encrypt_ccm(
|
||||
aad: &[u8],
|
||||
plaintext: &[u8],
|
||||
tag_len: usize,
|
||||
) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, crate::error::Error> {
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
(4..=16).contains(&tag_len) && tag_len % 2 == 0,
|
||||
"CCM tag_len 须为 4~16 的偶数"
|
||||
@@ -432,7 +470,7 @@ pub fn sm4_encrypt_ccm(
|
||||
let sm4 = Sm4Key::new(key);
|
||||
let rk = sm4.round_keys();
|
||||
|
||||
let t = ccm_cbc_mac(rk, nonce, aad, plaintext, tag_len);
|
||||
let t = ccm_cbc_mac(rk, nonce, aad, plaintext, tag_len)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut a0 = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
a0[0] = 2u8; // q-1 = 3-1 = 2
|
||||
@@ -457,7 +495,7 @@ pub fn sm4_encrypt_ccm(
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
out.extend_from_slice(&enc_tag[..tag_len]);
|
||||
out
|
||||
Ok(out)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// SM4-CCM 解密（AEAD）
|
||||
@@ -500,7 +538,7 @@ pub fn sm4_decrypt_ccm(
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 2: 对候选明文重新计算 CBC-MAC
|
||||
let t = ccm_cbc_mac(rk, nonce, aad, &plaintext, tag_len);
|
||||
let t = ccm_cbc_mac(rk, nonce, aad, &plaintext, tag_len)?;
|
||||
let mut expected_tag = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
for i in 0..tag_len {
|
||||
expected_tag[i] = t[i] ^ s0[i];
|
||||
@@ -536,14 +574,27 @@ fn xts_mul_alpha(tweak: &mut [u8; 16]) {
|
||||
/// - `key1`: 数据加密密钥（16 字节）
|
||||
/// - `key2`: tweak 加密密钥（16 字节）
|
||||
/// - `tweak_sector`: 扇区号（16 字节，通常为扇区编号的小端表示）
|
||||
/// - `data`: 明文（须为 16 字节整倍数）
|
||||
/// - `data`: 明文（须为 16 字节整倍数，不支持非对齐输入）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 错误
|
||||
/// `data` 为空或长度不是 16 的整倍数时返回 `Error::InvalidInputLength`。
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 注意
|
||||
/// XTS 的 ciphertext stealing（非对齐末尾块处理）超出本实现范围，
|
||||
/// 调用方须保证输入对齐；非对齐时须先在应用层填充后再调用。
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
|
||||
pub fn sm4_encrypt_xts(
|
||||
key1: &[u8; 16],
|
||||
key2: &[u8; 16],
|
||||
tweak_sector: &[u8; 16],
|
||||
data: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, crate::error::Error> {
|
||||
// Reason: 非对齐输入在旧实现中被静默丢弃（最后不足 16 字节块跳过），
|
||||
// 导致密文比明文短而调用方无感知。拒绝非对齐输入防止数据静默丢失。
|
||||
if data.is_empty() || data.len() % 16 != 0 {
|
||||
return Err(crate::error::Error::InvalidInputLength);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let sm4_1 = Sm4Key::new(key1);
|
||||
let sm4_2 = Sm4Key::new(key2);
|
||||
let mut tweak = *tweak_sector;
|
||||
@@ -551,29 +602,35 @@ pub fn sm4_encrypt_xts(
|
||||
|
||||
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(data.len());
|
||||
for chunk in data.chunks(16) {
|
||||
if chunk.len() == 16 {
|
||||
let mut block = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||||
block[i] = chunk[i] ^ tweak[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
sm4_1.encrypt_block(&mut block);
|
||||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||||
out.push(block[i] ^ tweak[i]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
xts_mul_alpha(&mut tweak);
|
||||
let mut block = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||||
block[i] = chunk[i] ^ tweak[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
sm4_1.encrypt_block(&mut block);
|
||||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||||
out.push(block[i] ^ tweak[i]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
xts_mul_alpha(&mut tweak);
|
||||
}
|
||||
out
|
||||
Ok(out)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// SM4-XTS 解密（磁盘加密模式）
|
||||
/// SM4-XTS 解密（磁盘加密模式，GB/T 17964-2021）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// # 错误
|
||||
/// `data` 为空或长度不是 16 的整倍数时返回 `Error::InvalidInputLength`。
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
|
||||
pub fn sm4_decrypt_xts(
|
||||
key1: &[u8; 16],
|
||||
key2: &[u8; 16],
|
||||
tweak_sector: &[u8; 16],
|
||||
data: &[u8],
|
||||
) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, crate::error::Error> {
|
||||
// Reason: 同 sm4_encrypt_xts，拒绝非对齐输入防止数据静默丢失。
|
||||
if data.is_empty() || data.len() % 16 != 0 {
|
||||
return Err(crate::error::Error::InvalidInputLength);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let sm4_1 = Sm4Key::new(key1);
|
||||
let sm4_2 = Sm4Key::new(key2);
|
||||
let mut tweak = *tweak_sector;
|
||||
@@ -581,19 +638,17 @@ pub fn sm4_decrypt_xts(
|
||||
|
||||
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(data.len());
|
||||
for chunk in data.chunks(16) {
|
||||
if chunk.len() == 16 {
|
||||
let mut block = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||||
block[i] = chunk[i] ^ tweak[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
sm4_1.decrypt_block(&mut block);
|
||||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||||
out.push(block[i] ^ tweak[i]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
xts_mul_alpha(&mut tweak);
|
||||
let mut block = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||||
block[i] = chunk[i] ^ tweak[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
sm4_1.decrypt_block(&mut block);
|
||||
for i in 0..16 {
|
||||
out.push(block[i] ^ tweak[i]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
xts_mul_alpha(&mut tweak);
|
||||
}
|
||||
out
|
||||
Ok(out)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── 测试 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
@@ -656,7 +711,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
let aad = b"ccm aad";
|
||||
let plain = b"ccm plaintext!!!";
|
||||
|
||||
let ct = sm4_encrypt_ccm(&key, &nonce, aad, plain, 16);
|
||||
let ct = sm4_encrypt_ccm(&key, &nonce, aad, plain, 16).unwrap();
|
||||
let pt = sm4_decrypt_ccm(&key, &nonce, aad, &ct, 16).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(pt, plain, "CCM 往返解密失败");
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -666,7 +721,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
fn test_ccm_tag_tamper() {
|
||||
let key = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let nonce = [0u8; 12];
|
||||
let mut ct = sm4_encrypt_ccm(&key, &nonce, b"", b"secret data here", 16);
|
||||
let mut ct = sm4_encrypt_ccm(&key, &nonce, b"", b"secret data here", 16).unwrap();
|
||||
// 篡改 tag（最后 16 字节）
|
||||
let last = ct.len() - 1;
|
||||
ct[last] ^= 1;
|
||||
@@ -676,6 +731,58 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// CCM AAD 超限应返回错误（而非静默跳过）
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ccm_aad_too_long() {
|
||||
let key = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let nonce = [0u8; 12];
|
||||
let big_aad = [0u8; 511]; // 超过 510 字节限制
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
sm4_encrypt_ccm(&key, &nonce, &big_aad, b"data", 16).is_err(),
|
||||
"AAD 超过 510 字节时应返回 InvalidInputLength"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// XTS 加解密往返测试
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_xts_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let key1 = [0x11u8; 16];
|
||||
let key2 = [0x22u8; 16];
|
||||
let tweak = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let plain = [0x42u8; 32]; // 2 个 16 字节块
|
||||
|
||||
let ct = sm4_encrypt_xts(&key1, &key2, &tweak, &plain).unwrap();
|
||||
let pt = sm4_decrypt_xts(&key1, &key2, &tweak, &ct).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(pt, plain, "XTS 往返解密失败");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// XTS 非对齐数据应返回错误
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_xts_non_aligned_rejected() {
|
||||
let key1 = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let key2 = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
let tweak = [0u8; 16];
|
||||
|
||||
// 空输入
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
sm4_encrypt_xts(&key1, &key2, &tweak, b"").is_err(),
|
||||
"空输入应返回 InvalidInputLength"
|
||||
);
|
||||
// 非 16 倍数
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
sm4_encrypt_xts(&key1, &key2, &tweak, b"not-aligned-data").is_ok(),
|
||||
"正好 16 字节不应返回错误"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
sm4_encrypt_xts(&key1, &key2, &tweak, &[0u8; 17]).is_err(),
|
||||
"17 字节应返回 InvalidInputLength"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
sm4_decrypt_xts(&key1, &key2, &tweak, &[0u8; 15]).is_err(),
|
||||
"15 字节应返回 InvalidInputLength"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// OFB 自反性验证
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ofb_self_inverse() {
|
||||
|
||||
+88
-35
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
|
||||
//! SM9 BN256 六次/十二次扩域 Fp6 / Fp12
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! 塔式扩域：
|
||||
//! Fp2 = Fp[u]/(u²+2)
|
||||
//! Fp6 = Fp2[v]/(v³-u) 即 v³ = u
|
||||
//! Fp12 = Fp6[w]/(w²-v) 即 w² = v
|
||||
//! `Fp2 = Fp[u]/(u²+2)`
|
||||
//! `Fp6 = Fp2[v]/(v³-u)` 即 v³ = u
|
||||
//! `Fp12 = Fp6[w]/(w²-v)` 即 w² = v
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Frobenius 系数为编译期常量，源自 GB/T 38635.1-2020 及参考实现。
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -489,7 +489,8 @@ pub fn fp12_to_bytes(a: &Fp12) -> [u8; 384] {
|
||||
/// - a: yP 系数 -> c0.c0（1 slot，在 eval_line_at_p 中乘以 yP）
|
||||
/// - b: 常数项 -> c0.c1（v slot）
|
||||
/// - c: xP 系数 -> c1.c0（w slot，在 eval_line_at_p 中乘以 xP）
|
||||
/// Reason: 经双线性性测试验证，此约定对应 D-type twist BN256 配对正确系数。
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Reason: 经双线性性测试验证，此约定对应 D-type twist BN256 配对正确系数。
|
||||
/// double step: a=Z₁²·u, b=-2Y₁Z₁, c=3X₁²
|
||||
/// add step: a=r·x2, b=-(r·x1+h·y1), c=h·y2
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)]
|
||||
@@ -509,7 +510,7 @@ pub struct LineEval {
|
||||
/// - a 系数（yP 项）→ c0.c0 (1 slot)
|
||||
/// - b 系数（常数项）→ c1.c1 (vw slot)
|
||||
/// - c 系数（xP 项）→ c1.c2 (v²w slot)
|
||||
/// a、c 已经在 eval_line_at_p 中分别乘以 yP 和 xP。
|
||||
/// a、c 已经在 eval_line_at_p 中分别乘以 yP 和 xP。
|
||||
pub fn fp12_mul_by_line(f: &Fp12, l: &LineEval) -> Fp12 {
|
||||
let line_fp12 = Fp12 {
|
||||
c0: Fp6 {
|
||||
@@ -526,7 +527,6 @@ pub fn fp12_mul_by_line(f: &Fp12, l: &LineEval) -> Fp12 {
|
||||
fp12_mul(f, &line_fp12)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
@@ -591,15 +591,25 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
/// 验证稀疏线函数乘法与全量 fp12_mul 结果一致
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_fp12_mul_by_line_matches_full_mul() { // 构造一个非平凡的 f
|
||||
fn test_fp12_mul_by_line_matches_full_mul() {
|
||||
// 构造一个非平凡的 f
|
||||
let f = Fp12 {
|
||||
c0: Fp6 {
|
||||
c0: Fp2 { c0: Fp::ONE, c1: Fp::ONE },
|
||||
c1: Fp2 { c0: Fp::ONE, c1: Fp::ZERO },
|
||||
c0: Fp2 {
|
||||
c0: Fp::ONE,
|
||||
c1: Fp::ONE,
|
||||
},
|
||||
c1: Fp2 {
|
||||
c0: Fp::ONE,
|
||||
c1: Fp::ZERO,
|
||||
},
|
||||
c2: Fp2::ZERO,
|
||||
},
|
||||
c1: Fp6 {
|
||||
c0: Fp2 { c0: Fp::ZERO, c1: Fp::ONE },
|
||||
c0: Fp2 {
|
||||
c0: Fp::ZERO,
|
||||
c1: Fp::ONE,
|
||||
},
|
||||
c1: Fp2::ZERO,
|
||||
c2: Fp2::ZERO,
|
||||
},
|
||||
@@ -607,9 +617,18 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
// 构造非零线函数
|
||||
let l = LineEval {
|
||||
a: Fp2 { c0: Fp::ONE, c1: Fp::ONE },
|
||||
b: Fp2 { c0: Fp::ONE, c1: Fp::ZERO },
|
||||
c: Fp2 { c0: Fp::ZERO, c1: Fp::ONE },
|
||||
a: Fp2 {
|
||||
c0: Fp::ONE,
|
||||
c1: Fp::ONE,
|
||||
},
|
||||
b: Fp2 {
|
||||
c0: Fp::ONE,
|
||||
c1: Fp::ZERO,
|
||||
},
|
||||
c: Fp2 {
|
||||
c0: Fp::ZERO,
|
||||
c1: Fp::ONE,
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// 稀疏乘法结果
|
||||
@@ -618,8 +637,16 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
// 构造全量 Fp12 线函数并做全量乘法（与 fp12_mul_by_line slot 保持一致）
|
||||
// 槽位约定：a→c0.c0(1), b→c1.c1(vw), c→c1.c2(v²w)
|
||||
let line_full = Fp12 {
|
||||
c0: Fp6 { c0: l.a, c1: Fp2::ZERO, c2: Fp2::ZERO },
|
||||
c1: Fp6 { c0: Fp2::ZERO, c1: l.b, c2: l.c },
|
||||
c0: Fp6 {
|
||||
c0: l.a,
|
||||
c1: Fp2::ZERO,
|
||||
c2: Fp2::ZERO,
|
||||
},
|
||||
c1: Fp6 {
|
||||
c0: Fp2::ZERO,
|
||||
c1: l.b,
|
||||
c2: l.c,
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
let full = fp12_mul(&f, &line_full);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -631,17 +658,34 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
fn test_frob_w3_derivation() {
|
||||
// 验证 fp12 Frobenius 一致性：frob_p(frob_p(f)) == frob_p2(f)
|
||||
let f = Fp12 {
|
||||
c0: Fp6 { c0: Fp2 { c0: Fp::ONE, c1: Fp::ONE }, c1: Fp2::ONE, c2: Fp2::ZERO },
|
||||
c1: Fp6 { c0: Fp2::ONE, c1: Fp2::ZERO, c2: Fp2::ZERO },
|
||||
c0: Fp6 {
|
||||
c0: Fp2 {
|
||||
c0: Fp::ONE,
|
||||
c1: Fp::ONE,
|
||||
},
|
||||
c1: Fp2::ONE,
|
||||
c2: Fp2::ZERO,
|
||||
},
|
||||
c1: Fp6 {
|
||||
c0: Fp2::ONE,
|
||||
c1: Fp2::ZERO,
|
||||
c2: Fp2::ZERO,
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
let fp1 = fp12_frobenius_p(&f);
|
||||
let fp1p1 = fp12_frobenius_p(&fp1); // frob_p^2(f)
|
||||
let fp1p1 = fp12_frobenius_p(&fp1); // frob_p^2(f)
|
||||
let fp2 = fp12_frobenius_p2(&f);
|
||||
assert_eq!(fp1p1, fp2, "frob_p(frob_p(f)) != frob_p2(f)：fp12 Frobenius 不一致");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
fp1p1, fp2,
|
||||
"frob_p(frob_p(f)) != frob_p2(f)：fp12 Frobenius 不一致"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
let fp2p1 = fp12_frobenius_p(&fp2); // frob_p^3(f)
|
||||
let fp2p1 = fp12_frobenius_p(&fp2); // frob_p^3(f)
|
||||
let fp3 = fp12_frobenius_p3(&f);
|
||||
assert_eq!(fp2p1, fp3, "frob_p(frob_p2(f)) != frob_p3(f)：fp12_frobenius_p3 系数错误");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
fp2p1, fp3,
|
||||
"frob_p(frob_p2(f)) != frob_p3(f)：fp12_frobenius_p3 系数错误"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// 验证 Fp6 Frobenius 保持 ONE
|
||||
@@ -661,7 +705,10 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
fn test_frob_v1_squared() {
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp2::fp2_mul;
|
||||
let v1_sq = fp2_mul(&FROB_V1_0, &FROB_V1_0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(v1_sq, FROB_V1_1, "FROB_V1_0² 应等于 FROB_V1_1（fp6 Frobenius 一致性）");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
v1_sq, FROB_V1_1,
|
||||
"FROB_V1_0² 应等于 FROB_V1_1（fp6 Frobenius 一致性）"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// 计算 u^{(p-1)/3} 并与 FROB_V1_0 对比（验证常量正确性）
|
||||
@@ -670,14 +717,15 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_frob_v1_0_value_correct() {
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp::FIELD_MODULUS;
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp2::{fp2_mul, fp2_square};
|
||||
use subtle::ConditionallySelectable;
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp2::fp2_mul;
|
||||
// 计算 u^{(p-1)/3} 其中 u = (0, 1) ∈ Fp2
|
||||
let pm1 = FIELD_MODULUS.wrapping_sub(&crypto_bigint::U256::ONE);
|
||||
let (pm1_div3, rem) = pm1.div_rem(&crypto_bigint::NonZero::new(crypto_bigint::U256::from(3u32)).unwrap());
|
||||
let (pm1_div3, rem) =
|
||||
pm1.div_rem(&crypto_bigint::NonZero::new(crypto_bigint::U256::from(3u32)).unwrap());
|
||||
assert_eq!(rem, crypto_bigint::U256::ZERO, "(p-1) 应被 3 整除");
|
||||
|
||||
let (pm1_div6, _) = pm1.div_rem(&crypto_bigint::NonZero::new(crypto_bigint::U256::from(6u32)).unwrap());
|
||||
let (pm1_div6, _) =
|
||||
pm1.div_rem(&crypto_bigint::NonZero::new(crypto_bigint::U256::from(6u32)).unwrap());
|
||||
|
||||
fn fp2_pow_exp(base: &Fp2, exp: &crypto_bigint::U256) -> Fp2 {
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp2::{fp2_mul, fp2_square};
|
||||
@@ -695,7 +743,10 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
result
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let u = Fp2 { c0: crate::sm9::fields::fp::Fp::ZERO, c1: crate::sm9::fields::fp::Fp::ONE };
|
||||
let u = Fp2 {
|
||||
c0: crate::sm9::fields::fp::Fp::ZERO,
|
||||
c1: crate::sm9::fields::fp::Fp::ONE,
|
||||
};
|
||||
// 正确的 γ_{1,1} = u^{(p-1)/3}
|
||||
let correct_v1_0 = fp2_pow_exp(&u, &pm1_div3);
|
||||
// 正确的 δ_{1,1} = u^{(p-1)/6}（FROB_W1）
|
||||
@@ -707,7 +758,8 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
// 打印正确的常量值（以标准 32 字节大端 hex 格式，供直接写入代码）
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
correct_v1_0, FROB_V1_0,
|
||||
correct_v1_0,
|
||||
FROB_V1_0,
|
||||
"FROB_V1_0 需更新：正确值={:02X?}, FROB_W1 正确值 c0={:02X?} c1={:02X?}",
|
||||
correct_v1_0.c0.retrieve().to_be_bytes(),
|
||||
correct_w1.c0.retrieve().to_be_bytes(),
|
||||
@@ -742,24 +794,25 @@ mod g2_frob_tests {
|
||||
|
||||
let p = FIELD_MODULUS;
|
||||
let pm1 = p.wrapping_sub(&crypto_bigint::U256::ONE);
|
||||
let u = Fp2 { c0: Fp::ZERO, c1: Fp::ONE };
|
||||
let u = Fp2 {
|
||||
c0: Fp::ZERO,
|
||||
c1: Fp::ONE,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let pm1_div2 = pm1.wrapping_shr(1);
|
||||
let u_pm1_div2 = fp2_pow_exp(&u, &pm1_div2);
|
||||
|
||||
let (pm1_div3, _) = pm1.div_rem(&crypto_bigint::NonZero::new(crypto_bigint::U256::from(3u32)).unwrap());
|
||||
let (pm1_div3, _) =
|
||||
pm1.div_rem(&crypto_bigint::NonZero::new(crypto_bigint::U256::from(3u32)).unwrap());
|
||||
let u_pm1_div3 = fp2_pow_exp(&u, &pm1_div3);
|
||||
|
||||
let pp1 = p.wrapping_add(&crypto_bigint::U256::ONE);
|
||||
let u_pm21_div3 = fp2_pow_exp(&u_pm1_div3, &pp1);
|
||||
let u_pm21_div2 = fp2_pow_exp(&u_pm1_div2, &pp1);
|
||||
|
||||
// Reason: 验证 G2 Frobenius 修正常量与计算值一致
|
||||
// u^{(p-1)/2} 应等于 G2_FROB_Y1
|
||||
assert_eq!(u_pm1_div2, G2_FROB_Y1,
|
||||
"u^(p-1)/2 应等于 G2_FROB_Y1");
|
||||
assert_eq!(u_pm1_div2, G2_FROB_Y1, "u^(p-1)/2 应等于 G2_FROB_Y1");
|
||||
// u^{(p²-1)/3} 应等于 G2_FROB_X2
|
||||
assert_eq!(u_pm21_div3, G2_FROB_X2,
|
||||
"u^(p2-1)/3 应等于 G2_FROB_X2");
|
||||
assert_eq!(u_pm21_div3, G2_FROB_X2, "u^(p2-1)/3 应等于 G2_FROB_X2");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
//! SM9 BN256 二次扩域 Fp2
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Fp2 = Fp[u] / (u² + 2)
|
||||
//! `Fp2 = Fp[u] / (u² + 2)`
|
||||
//! 即 u² = -2
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! 元素表示为 a = a0 + a1·u，其中 a0, a1 ∈ Fp
|
||||
@@ -177,7 +177,6 @@ pub fn fp2_conjugate(a: &Fp2) -> Fp2 {
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp::fp_from_bytes;
|
||||
|
||||
fn fp2_one() -> Fp2 {
|
||||
Fp2::ONE
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ impl G1Jacobian {
|
||||
|
||||
/// 点倍运算（BN256 a=0 专用公式）
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// 公式来自 https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-0.html#doubling-dbl-2009-l
|
||||
/// 公式来自 <https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-0.html#doubling-dbl-2009-l>
|
||||
pub fn double(&self) -> Self {
|
||||
if self.is_infinity() {
|
||||
return *self;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -149,9 +149,9 @@ impl G2Jacobian {
|
||||
// c = -3X₁²·Z₁² = -e·z1sq（在 eval_line_at_p 中乘以 xP→c1.c2(v²w)）
|
||||
let z1sq = fp2_square(z1);
|
||||
let line = LineEval {
|
||||
a: fp2_mul_u(&fp2_mul(&z3, &z1sq)), // 2Y₁Z₁³·u（×yP→c0.c0）
|
||||
a: fp2_mul_u(&fp2_mul(&z3, &z1sq)), // 2Y₁Z₁³·u（×yP→c0.c0）
|
||||
b: fp2_sub(&fp2_mul(x1, &e), &fp2_add(&b, &b)), // 3X₁³-2Y₁²（→c1.c1(vw)）
|
||||
c: fp2_neg(&fp2_mul(&e, &z1sq)), // -3X₁²Z₁²（×xP→c1.c2(v²w)）
|
||||
c: fp2_neg(&fp2_mul(&e, &z1sq)), // -3X₁²Z₁²（×xP→c1.c2(v²w)）
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
(
|
||||
@@ -190,9 +190,9 @@ impl G2Jacobian {
|
||||
// b = X₁·Y₂·Z₁ - X₂·Y₁（常数项→c1.c1(vw)）
|
||||
// c = -(Y₂Z₁³-Y₁) = -r（r已算，在 eval_line_at_p 中乘以 xP→c1.c2(v²w)）
|
||||
let line = LineEval {
|
||||
a: fp2_mul_u(&z3), // H·Z₁·u（×yP→c0.c0）
|
||||
a: fp2_mul_u(&z3), // H·Z₁·u（×yP→c0.c0）
|
||||
b: fp2_sub(&fp2_mul(&fp2_mul(x1, z1), y2), &fp2_mul(x2, y1)), // X₁Y₂Z₁-X₂Y₁（→c1.c1(vw)）
|
||||
c: fp2_neg(&r), // -(Y₂Z₁³-Y₁)（×xP→c1.c2(v²w)）
|
||||
c: fp2_neg(&r), // -(Y₂Z₁³-Y₁)（×xP→c1.c2(v²w)）
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
(
|
||||
|
||||
+86
-36
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ pub fn generate_sign_master_keypair<R: RngCore>(rng: &mut R) -> (Sm9MasterPrivKe
|
||||
/// GB/T 38635.2-2020 §6.1：
|
||||
/// t1 = H1(ID||hid, N) + ks
|
||||
/// t2 = ks · t1^{-1} mod N（注意：不是 t1^{-1}·P1，而是 ks·t1^{-1}·P1）
|
||||
/// dA = [t2]P1
|
||||
/// dA = \[t2\]P1
|
||||
/// hid = 0x01（签名）
|
||||
pub fn generate_sign_user_key(
|
||||
master_priv: &Sm9MasterPrivKey,
|
||||
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ pub fn generate_enc_master_keypair<R: RngCore>(rng: &mut R) -> (Sm9MasterPrivKey
|
||||
/// GB/T 38635.1-2020 §6.1（加密密钥派生）：
|
||||
/// t1 = H1(ID||hid, N) + ke
|
||||
/// t2 = ke · t1^{-1} mod N
|
||||
/// de = [t2]P1
|
||||
/// de = \[t2\]P1
|
||||
pub fn generate_enc_user_key(
|
||||
master_priv: &Sm9MasterPrivKey,
|
||||
id: &[u8],
|
||||
@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_generate_sign_master_keypair() {
|
||||
let mut rng = FakeRng([0x42u8; 32]);
|
||||
let (ks, ppub) = generate_sign_master_keypair(&mut rng);
|
||||
let (_ks, ppub) = generate_sign_master_keypair(&mut rng);
|
||||
// 验证 ppub 在 G2 上
|
||||
let p = G2Affine::from_bytes(ppub.as_bytes()).expect("公钥应有效");
|
||||
assert!(p.is_on_curve());
|
||||
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_pairing_bilinear() {
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp12::{fp12_mul, Fp12};
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp12::fp12_mul;
|
||||
use crate::sm9::groups::g1::{G1Affine, G1Jacobian};
|
||||
use crate::sm9::groups::g2::{G2Affine, G2Jacobian};
|
||||
use crate::sm9::pairing::pairing;
|
||||
@@ -617,24 +617,33 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
let q = G2Affine::generator();
|
||||
|
||||
// 验证 G1 scalar_mul(2) == G1.double()
|
||||
let g1_2_by_mul = G1Jacobian::scalar_mul_g1(&U256::from(2u32)).to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
let g1_2_by_mul = G1Jacobian::scalar_mul_g1(&U256::from(2u32))
|
||||
.to_affine()
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let g1_jac = G1Jacobian::from_affine(&p);
|
||||
let g1_2_by_double = g1_jac.double().to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp::fp_to_bytes;
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
fp_to_bytes(&g1_2_by_mul.x), fp_to_bytes(&g1_2_by_double.x),
|
||||
fp_to_bytes(&g1_2_by_mul.x),
|
||||
fp_to_bytes(&g1_2_by_double.x),
|
||||
"G1 scalar_mul(2) != G1.double() in x"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
fp_to_bytes(&g1_2_by_mul.y), fp_to_bytes(&g1_2_by_double.y),
|
||||
fp_to_bytes(&g1_2_by_mul.y),
|
||||
fp_to_bytes(&g1_2_by_double.y),
|
||||
"G1 scalar_mul(2) != G1.double() in y"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// 验证 G2 scalar_mul(2) == G2.double()
|
||||
let g2_jac = G2Jacobian::from_affine(&q);
|
||||
let g2_2_by_mul = G2Jacobian::scalar_mul_g2(&U256::from(2u32)).to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
let g2_2_by_mul = G2Jacobian::scalar_mul_g2(&U256::from(2u32))
|
||||
.to_affine()
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let g2_2_by_double = g2_jac.double().to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(g2_2_by_mul, g2_2_by_double, "G2 scalar_mul(2) != G2.double()");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
g2_2_by_mul, g2_2_by_double,
|
||||
"G2 scalar_mul(2) != G2.double()"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// e(2G1, G2) == e(G1, G2)^2
|
||||
let e_2g1_g2 = pairing(&g1_2_by_mul, &q);
|
||||
@@ -643,25 +652,30 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
|
||||
// 中间验证：用 G1+G1 （点加法）得到 2G1
|
||||
let g1_jac2 = G1Jacobian::from_affine(&p);
|
||||
let g1_add_g1 = G1Jacobian::add(&G1Jacobian::from_affine(&p), &g1_jac2).to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
let g1_add_g1 = G1Jacobian::add(&G1Jacobian::from_affine(&p), &g1_jac2)
|
||||
.to_affine()
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let e_addg1_g2 = pairing(&g1_add_g1, &q);
|
||||
assert_eq!(e_addg1_g2, e_sq, "e(G1+G1,G2) != e(G1,G2)²（用点加法）");
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(e_2g1_g2, e_sq, "配对双线性性验证失败：e(2G1,G2) != e(G1,G2)²");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
e_2g1_g2, e_sq,
|
||||
"配对双线性性验证失败：e(2G1,G2) != e(G1,G2)²"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// e(G1, 2G2) == e(G1, G2)^2
|
||||
let e_g1_2g2 = pairing(&p, &g2_2_by_mul);
|
||||
assert_eq!(e_g1_2g2, e_sq, "配对双线性性验证失败：e(G1,2G2) != e(G1,G2)²");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
e_g1_2g2, e_sq,
|
||||
"配对双线性性验证失败：e(G1,2G2) != e(G1,G2)²"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod pairing_tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp12::{
|
||||
fp12_conjugate, fp12_frobenius_p, fp12_frobenius_p2, fp12_frobenius_p3,
|
||||
fp12_inv, fp12_mul, fp12_square, Fp12,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp12::{fp12_conjugate, fp12_frobenius_p, fp12_mul, fp12_square, Fp12};
|
||||
use crate::sm9::groups::g1::{G1Affine, G1Jacobian};
|
||||
use crate::sm9::groups::g2::{G2Affine, G2Jacobian};
|
||||
use crate::sm9::pairing::{final_exp, miller_loop, pairing};
|
||||
@@ -671,7 +685,9 @@ mod pairing_tests {
|
||||
fn test_pairing_double_only() {
|
||||
let p = G1Affine::generator();
|
||||
let q = G2Affine::generator();
|
||||
let g1_2 = G1Jacobian::scalar_mul_g1(&U256::from(2u32)).to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
let g1_2 = G1Jacobian::scalar_mul_g1(&U256::from(2u32))
|
||||
.to_affine()
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let e_g1_g2 = pairing(&p, &q);
|
||||
let e_sq = fp12_mul(&e_g1_g2, &e_g1_g2);
|
||||
@@ -687,7 +703,9 @@ mod pairing_tests {
|
||||
fn test_miller_loop_raw_bilinear() {
|
||||
let p = G1Affine::generator();
|
||||
let q = G2Affine::generator();
|
||||
let g1_2 = G1Jacobian::scalar_mul_g1(&U256::from(2u32)).to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
let g1_2 = G1Jacobian::scalar_mul_g1(&U256::from(2u32))
|
||||
.to_affine()
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let ml1 = miller_loop(&q, &p);
|
||||
let ml2 = miller_loop(&q, &g1_2);
|
||||
@@ -699,14 +717,20 @@ mod pairing_tests {
|
||||
let ml1_sq_inv = fp12_inv(&ml1_sq).expect("inv should exist");
|
||||
let ratio = fp12_mul(&ml2, &ml1_sq_inv);
|
||||
let ratio_exp = final_exp(&ratio);
|
||||
assert_eq!(ratio_exp, Fp12::ONE, "final_exp(ml(2G1,G2)/ml(G1,G2)^2) != 1");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
ratio_exp,
|
||||
Fp12::ONE,
|
||||
"final_exp(ml(2G1,G2)/ml(G1,G2)^2) != 1"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_miller_loop_bilinear() {
|
||||
let p = G1Affine::generator();
|
||||
let q = G2Affine::generator();
|
||||
let g1_2 = G1Jacobian::scalar_mul_g1(&U256::from(2u32)).to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
let g1_2 = G1Jacobian::scalar_mul_g1(&U256::from(2u32))
|
||||
.to_affine()
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let ml_g1_g2 = miller_loop(&q, &p);
|
||||
let ml_2g1_g2 = miller_loop(&q, &g1_2);
|
||||
@@ -714,7 +738,10 @@ mod pairing_tests {
|
||||
let gt1 = final_exp(&ml_g1_g2);
|
||||
let gt2 = final_exp(&ml_2g1_g2);
|
||||
let gt1_sq = fp12_square(>1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(gt2, gt1_sq, "final_exp(ml(2G1,G2)) != final_exp(ml(G1,G2))^2");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
gt2, gt1_sq,
|
||||
"final_exp(ml(2G1,G2)) != final_exp(ml(G1,G2))^2"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
@@ -736,7 +763,11 @@ mod pairing_tests {
|
||||
base = fp12_mul(&base, &base);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert_eq!(result, Fp12::ONE, "e(G1,G2)^n != 1: GT element not in subgroup");
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
result,
|
||||
Fp12::ONE,
|
||||
"e(G1,G2)^n != 1: GT element not in subgroup"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// 验证 ml^{p^6} == conjugate(ml)（Frobenius 正确性检查）
|
||||
@@ -746,8 +777,9 @@ mod pairing_tests {
|
||||
let q = G2Affine::generator();
|
||||
let ml = miller_loop(&q, &p);
|
||||
|
||||
let ml_p6 = fp12_frobenius_p(&fp12_frobenius_p(&fp12_frobenius_p(
|
||||
&fp12_frobenius_p(&fp12_frobenius_p(&fp12_frobenius_p(&ml))))));
|
||||
let ml_p6 = fp12_frobenius_p(&fp12_frobenius_p(&fp12_frobenius_p(&fp12_frobenius_p(
|
||||
&fp12_frobenius_p(&fp12_frobenius_p(&ml)),
|
||||
))));
|
||||
let ml_conj = fp12_conjugate(&ml);
|
||||
assert_eq!(ml_p6, ml_conj, "ml^{{p^6}} != conjugate(ml)");
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -759,7 +791,6 @@ mod pairing_tests {
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_single_double_step_line() {
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp::fp_to_bytes;
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp12::fp12_inv;
|
||||
|
||||
let g1 = G1Affine::generator();
|
||||
let g2 = G2Affine::generator();
|
||||
@@ -773,7 +804,9 @@ mod pairing_tests {
|
||||
let g1_jac = G1Jacobian::from_affine(&g1);
|
||||
let g1_2_by_add = G1Jacobian::add(&g1_jac, &g1_jac).to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
// 用标量乘法计算 2·G1
|
||||
let g1_2_by_mul = G1Jacobian::scalar_mul_g1(&U256::from(2u32)).to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
let g1_2_by_mul = G1Jacobian::scalar_mul_g1(&U256::from(2u32))
|
||||
.to_affine()
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
// 验证两种方式得到相同的 2G1
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
@@ -788,7 +821,9 @@ mod pairing_tests {
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// 检验 G2 侧双线性性：e(G1, 2G2) == e(G1, G2)^2
|
||||
let g2_2 = G2Jacobian::scalar_mul_g2(&U256::from(2u32)).to_affine().unwrap();
|
||||
let g2_2 = G2Jacobian::scalar_mul_g2(&U256::from(2u32))
|
||||
.to_affine()
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let e_g1_2g2 = pairing(&g1, &g2_2);
|
||||
let e_g1_g2_sq = fp12_mul(&e1, &e1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
@@ -804,25 +839,40 @@ mod pairing_tests {
|
||||
/// 约定：a -> c0.c0(1 slot), b -> c0.c1(v slot), c -> c1.c0(w slot)
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_line_eval_equivalence() {
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp12::{
|
||||
fp12_mul, fp12_mul_by_line, Fp12, Fp6, LineEval,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp2::Fp2;
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp::Fp;
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp12::{fp12_mul, fp12_mul_by_line, Fp12, Fp6, LineEval};
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp2::Fp2;
|
||||
|
||||
// 验证 fp12_mul_by_line 等价于按约定槽位构造 full Fp12 再乘
|
||||
// 约定：a -> c0.c0(1 slot), b -> c1.c1(vw slot), c -> c1.c2(v²w slot)
|
||||
let line = LineEval {
|
||||
a: Fp2 { c0: Fp::ONE, c1: Fp::ZERO },
|
||||
b: Fp2 { c0: Fp::ONE, c1: Fp::ZERO },
|
||||
c: Fp2 { c0: Fp::ONE, c1: Fp::ZERO },
|
||||
a: Fp2 {
|
||||
c0: Fp::ONE,
|
||||
c1: Fp::ZERO,
|
||||
},
|
||||
b: Fp2 {
|
||||
c0: Fp::ONE,
|
||||
c1: Fp::ZERO,
|
||||
},
|
||||
c: Fp2 {
|
||||
c0: Fp::ONE,
|
||||
c1: Fp::ZERO,
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
let f = Fp12::ONE;
|
||||
let sparse_result = fp12_mul_by_line(&f, &line);
|
||||
// 按相同槽位手动构造 full Fp12（槽位 {c0.c0=a, c1.c1(vw)=b, c1.c2(v²w)=c}）
|
||||
let full_line = Fp12 {
|
||||
c0: Fp6 { c0: line.a, c1: Fp2::ZERO, c2: Fp2::ZERO },
|
||||
c1: Fp6 { c0: Fp2::ZERO, c1: line.b, c2: line.c },
|
||||
c0: Fp6 {
|
||||
c0: line.a,
|
||||
c1: Fp2::ZERO,
|
||||
c2: Fp2::ZERO,
|
||||
},
|
||||
c1: Fp6 {
|
||||
c0: Fp2::ZERO,
|
||||
c1: line.b,
|
||||
c2: line.c,
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
let full_result = fp12_mul(&f, &full_line);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
|
||||
+21
-22
@@ -9,9 +9,8 @@
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp::Fp;
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp12::{
|
||||
fp12_conjugate, fp12_frobenius_p, fp12_frobenius_p2, fp12_frobenius_p3,
|
||||
fp12_inv, fp12_mul, fp12_mul_by_line, fp12_square, Fp12, LineEval,
|
||||
G2_FROB_X1_INV, G2_FROB_Y1_INV, G2_FROB_X2_INV,
|
||||
fp12_conjugate, fp12_frobenius_p, fp12_frobenius_p2, fp12_frobenius_p3, fp12_inv, fp12_mul,
|
||||
fp12_mul_by_line, fp12_square, Fp12, LineEval, G2_FROB_X1_INV, G2_FROB_X2_INV, G2_FROB_Y1_INV,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use crate::sm9::fields::fp2::{fp2_frobenius, fp2_mul, fp2_mul_fp};
|
||||
use crate::sm9::groups::g1::G1Affine;
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +62,7 @@ fn g2_frobenius_p2_neg(q: &G2Affine) -> G2Affine {
|
||||
fn eval_line_at_p(line: &LineEval, px: &Fp, py: &Fp) -> LineEval {
|
||||
LineEval {
|
||||
a: fp2_mul_fp(&line.a, py), // a × yP（放 c0.c0 槽）
|
||||
b: line.b, // 常数项不变（放 c0.c1 v 槽）
|
||||
b: line.b, // 常数项不变（放 c0.c1 v 槽）
|
||||
c: fp2_mul_fp(&line.c, px), // c × xP（放 c1.c0 w 槽）
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -167,25 +166,25 @@ const SM9_NINE: u128 = 9;
|
||||
/// Reason: Beuchat et al. 分解针对标准 BN256（以太坊参数），不适用于 SM9 BN256。
|
||||
/// 此函数使用 sm9_core 的 final_exp_last_chunk 算法（基于 SM9_A2/A3 常量）。
|
||||
fn final_exp_hard(f: &Fp12) -> Fp12 {
|
||||
let a = fp12_cyclotomic_pow(f, SM9_A3); // f^{A3}
|
||||
let b = fp12_inv(&a).unwrap_or(Fp12::ONE); // f^{-A3}
|
||||
let c = fp12_frobenius_p(&b); // f^{-A3*p}
|
||||
let d = fp12_mul(&c, &b); // f^{-A3*(p+1)}
|
||||
let e = fp12_mul(&d, &b); // f^{-A3*(p+2)}
|
||||
let f_p1 = fp12_frobenius_p(f); // f^p
|
||||
let g = fp12_mul(f, &f_p1); // f^{p+1}
|
||||
let h = fp12_cyclotomic_pow(&g, SM9_NINE); // f^{9(p+1)}
|
||||
let i = fp12_mul(&e, &h); // f^{-A3*(p+2)+9(p+1)}
|
||||
let j = fp12_square(f); // f^2
|
||||
let k = fp12_square(&j); // f^4
|
||||
let l = fp12_mul(&k, &i); // f^{4 + -A3*(p+2) + 9(p+1)}
|
||||
let m = fp12_square(&f_p1); // f^{2p}
|
||||
let n = fp12_mul(&d, &m); // f^{-A3*(p+1)+2p}
|
||||
let o = fp12_frobenius_p2(f); // f^{p^2}
|
||||
let p_var = fp12_mul(&o, &n); // f^{p^2-A3*(p+1)+2p}
|
||||
let q = fp12_cyclotomic_pow(&p_var, SM9_A2); // ...^{A2}
|
||||
let a = fp12_cyclotomic_pow(f, SM9_A3); // f^{A3}
|
||||
let b = fp12_inv(&a).unwrap_or(Fp12::ONE); // f^{-A3}
|
||||
let c = fp12_frobenius_p(&b); // f^{-A3*p}
|
||||
let d = fp12_mul(&c, &b); // f^{-A3*(p+1)}
|
||||
let e = fp12_mul(&d, &b); // f^{-A3*(p+2)}
|
||||
let f_p1 = fp12_frobenius_p(f); // f^p
|
||||
let g = fp12_mul(f, &f_p1); // f^{p+1}
|
||||
let h = fp12_cyclotomic_pow(&g, SM9_NINE); // f^{9(p+1)}
|
||||
let i = fp12_mul(&e, &h); // f^{-A3*(p+2)+9(p+1)}
|
||||
let j = fp12_square(f); // f^2
|
||||
let k = fp12_square(&j); // f^4
|
||||
let l = fp12_mul(&k, &i); // f^{4 + -A3*(p+2) + 9(p+1)}
|
||||
let m = fp12_square(&f_p1); // f^{2p}
|
||||
let n = fp12_mul(&d, &m); // f^{-A3*(p+1)+2p}
|
||||
let o = fp12_frobenius_p2(f); // f^{p^2}
|
||||
let p_var = fp12_mul(&o, &n); // f^{p^2-A3*(p+1)+2p}
|
||||
let q = fp12_cyclotomic_pow(&p_var, SM9_A2); // ...^{A2}
|
||||
let r = fp12_mul(&q, &l);
|
||||
let s = fp12_frobenius_p3(f); // f^{p^3}
|
||||
let s = fp12_frobenius_p3(f); // f^{p^3}
|
||||
fp12_mul(&s, &r)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+7
-6
@@ -70,12 +70,13 @@ fn hash_to_range(z: &[u8], hid: u8, n: &U256) -> U256 {
|
||||
let h_raw = U256::from_be_slice(&ha[..32]);
|
||||
|
||||
// h = h_raw mod (n-1) + 1，确保 h ∈ [1, n-1]
|
||||
// 由于 h_raw 可能 ≥ n-1，使用模运算
|
||||
// crypto_bigint 无直接 mod，改用减法循环（n 是 256 位素数，循环次数最多 1 次）
|
||||
let mut h = h_raw;
|
||||
while h >= n_minus_1 {
|
||||
h = h.wrapping_sub(&n_minus_1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Reason: 原 while 循环的执行次数取决于 h_raw 是否 ≥ n-1，泄露 1 bit 信息。
|
||||
// 改用无条件减法 + 掩码选择（conditional_select），执行时间与 h_raw 值无关。
|
||||
// crypto_bigint::Uint 实现了 subtle::ConstantTimeLess，ct_lt 为常量时间比较。
|
||||
use subtle::{ConditionallySelectable, ConstantTimeLess};
|
||||
let need_reduce = !h_raw.ct_lt(&n_minus_1); // h_raw >= n_minus_1
|
||||
let reduced = h_raw.wrapping_sub(&n_minus_1);
|
||||
let h = U256::conditional_select(&h_raw, &reduced, need_reduce);
|
||||
h.wrapping_add(&U256::ONE)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+12
-24
@@ -13,14 +13,12 @@ use libsmx::sm2::{get_e, get_z, sign_with_k, verify, PrivateKey};
|
||||
fn test_sm2_sign_verify_with_known_key() {
|
||||
// GB/T 32918.2-2016 附录 A 私钥
|
||||
let d_bytes =
|
||||
hex::decode("3945208f7b2144b13f36e38ac6d39f95889393692860b51a42fb81ef4df7c5b8")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
hex::decode("3945208f7b2144b13f36e38ac6d39f95889393692860b51a42fb81ef4df7c5b8").unwrap();
|
||||
let k_bytes =
|
||||
hex::decode("59276e27d506861a16680f3ad9c02dccef3cc1fa3cdbe4ce6d54b80deac1bc21")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
hex::decode("59276e27d506861a16680f3ad9c02dccef3cc1fa3cdbe4ce6d54b80deac1bc21").unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let pri_key = PrivateKey::from_bytes(d_bytes.as_slice().try_into().unwrap())
|
||||
.expect("私钥应有效");
|
||||
let pri_key =
|
||||
PrivateKey::from_bytes(d_bytes.as_slice().try_into().unwrap()).expect("私钥应有效");
|
||||
let pub_key = pri_key.public_key();
|
||||
|
||||
let id = b"ALICE123@YAHOO.COM";
|
||||
@@ -43,15 +41,13 @@ fn test_sm2_sign_verify_with_known_key() {
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_sm2_different_messages_different_sigs() {
|
||||
let d_bytes =
|
||||
hex::decode("3945208f7b2144b13f36e38ac6d39f95889393692860b51a42fb81ef4df7c5b8")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
hex::decode("3945208f7b2144b13f36e38ac6d39f95889393692860b51a42fb81ef4df7c5b8").unwrap();
|
||||
let pri_key = PrivateKey::from_bytes(d_bytes.as_slice().try_into().unwrap()).unwrap();
|
||||
let pub_key = pri_key.public_key();
|
||||
|
||||
let id = b"test_user";
|
||||
let k = U256::from_be_slice(
|
||||
&hex::decode("59276e27d506861a16680f3ad9c02dccef3cc1fa3cdbe4ce6d54b80deac1bc21")
|
||||
.unwrap(),
|
||||
&hex::decode("59276e27d506861a16680f3ad9c02dccef3cc1fa3cdbe4ce6d54b80deac1bc21").unwrap(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
let z = get_z(id, &pub_key);
|
||||
@@ -69,8 +65,7 @@ fn test_sm2_different_messages_different_sigs() {
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_sm2_verify_tampered_message_fails() {
|
||||
let d_bytes =
|
||||
hex::decode("3945208f7b2144b13f36e38ac6d39f95889393692860b51a42fb81ef4df7c5b8")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
hex::decode("3945208f7b2144b13f36e38ac6d39f95889393692860b51a42fb81ef4df7c5b8").unwrap();
|
||||
let pri_key = PrivateKey::from_bytes(d_bytes.as_slice().try_into().unwrap()).unwrap();
|
||||
let pub_key = pri_key.public_key();
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -80,8 +75,7 @@ fn test_sm2_verify_tampered_message_fails() {
|
||||
let e = get_e(&z, msg);
|
||||
|
||||
let k = U256::from_be_slice(
|
||||
&hex::decode("59276e27d506861a16680f3ad9c02dccef3cc1fa3cdbe4ce6d54b80deac1bc21")
|
||||
.unwrap(),
|
||||
&hex::decode("59276e27d506861a16680f3ad9c02dccef3cc1fa3cdbe4ce6d54b80deac1bc21").unwrap(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
let sig = sign_with_k(&e, &pri_key, &k).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -97,8 +91,7 @@ fn test_sm2_verify_tampered_message_fails() {
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_sm2_verify_tampered_sig_fails() {
|
||||
let d_bytes =
|
||||
hex::decode("3945208f7b2144b13f36e38ac6d39f95889393692860b51a42fb81ef4df7c5b8")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
hex::decode("3945208f7b2144b13f36e38ac6d39f95889393692860b51a42fb81ef4df7c5b8").unwrap();
|
||||
let pri_key = PrivateKey::from_bytes(d_bytes.as_slice().try_into().unwrap()).unwrap();
|
||||
let pub_key = pri_key.public_key();
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -108,24 +101,19 @@ fn test_sm2_verify_tampered_sig_fails() {
|
||||
let e = get_e(&z, msg);
|
||||
|
||||
let k = U256::from_be_slice(
|
||||
&hex::decode("59276e27d506861a16680f3ad9c02dccef3cc1fa3cdbe4ce6d54b80deac1bc21")
|
||||
.unwrap(),
|
||||
&hex::decode("59276e27d506861a16680f3ad9c02dccef3cc1fa3cdbe4ce6d54b80deac1bc21").unwrap(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
let mut sig = sign_with_k(&e, &pri_key, &k).unwrap();
|
||||
sig[0] ^= 1; // 篡改 r 的第一字节
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
verify(&e, &pub_key, &sig).is_err(),
|
||||
"篡改签名后验签应失败"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(verify(&e, &pub_key, &sig).is_err(), "篡改签名后验签应失败");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Z 值计算确定性验证（相同输入产生相同 Z）
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_sm2_z_value_deterministic() {
|
||||
let d_bytes =
|
||||
hex::decode("3945208f7b2144b13f36e38ac6d39f95889393692860b51a42fb81ef4df7c5b8")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
hex::decode("3945208f7b2144b13f36e38ac6d39f95889393692860b51a42fb81ef4df7c5b8").unwrap();
|
||||
let pri_key = PrivateKey::from_bytes(d_bytes.as_slice().try_into().unwrap()).unwrap();
|
||||
let pub_key = pri_key.public_key();
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+16
-8
@@ -12,9 +12,13 @@ use libsmx::sm3::Sm3Hasher;
|
||||
fn test_sm3_vector_a1_abc() {
|
||||
let msg = b"abc";
|
||||
let digest = Sm3Hasher::digest(msg);
|
||||
let expected = hex::decode("66c7f0f462eeedd9d1f2d46bdc10e4e24167c4875cf2f7a2297da02b8f4ba8e0")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(digest.as_slice(), expected.as_slice(), "GB/T 32905 附录 A.1 失败");
|
||||
let expected =
|
||||
hex::decode("66c7f0f462eeedd9d1f2d46bdc10e4e24167c4875cf2f7a2297da02b8f4ba8e0").unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
digest.as_slice(),
|
||||
expected.as_slice(),
|
||||
"GB/T 32905 附录 A.1 失败"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// GB/T 32905-2016 附录 A.2
|
||||
@@ -24,9 +28,13 @@ fn test_sm3_vector_a1_abc() {
|
||||
fn test_sm3_vector_a2_64bytes() {
|
||||
let msg = b"abcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcdabcd";
|
||||
let digest = Sm3Hasher::digest(msg);
|
||||
let expected = hex::decode("debe9ff92275b8a138604889c18e5a4d6fdb70e5387e5765293dcba39c0c5732")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(digest.as_slice(), expected.as_slice(), "GB/T 32905 附录 A.2 失败");
|
||||
let expected =
|
||||
hex::decode("debe9ff92275b8a138604889c18e5a4d6fdb70e5387e5765293dcba39c0c5732").unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
digest.as_slice(),
|
||||
expected.as_slice(),
|
||||
"GB/T 32905 附录 A.2 失败"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// 流式接口与单次接口结果一致性验证
|
||||
@@ -48,7 +56,7 @@ fn test_sm3_streaming_equals_oneshot() {
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_sm3_empty_message() {
|
||||
let digest = Sm3Hasher::digest(b"");
|
||||
let expected = hex::decode("1ab21d8355cfa17f8e61194831e81a8f22bec8c728fefb747ed035eb5082aa2b")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let expected =
|
||||
hex::decode("1ab21d8355cfa17f8e61194831e81a8f22bec8c728fefb747ed035eb5082aa2b").unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(digest.as_slice(), expected.as_slice(), "SM3 空消息测试失败");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
|
||||
|
||||
use libsmx::sm9::{
|
||||
generate_enc_master_keypair, generate_enc_user_key, generate_sign_master_keypair,
|
||||
generate_sign_user_key, sm9_decrypt, sm9_encrypt, sm9_sign, sm9_verify,
|
||||
Sm9EncPubKey, Sm9MasterPrivKey, Sm9SignPubKey,
|
||||
generate_sign_user_key, sm9_decrypt, sm9_encrypt, sm9_sign, sm9_verify, Sm9EncPubKey,
|
||||
Sm9SignPubKey,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use rand_core::RngCore;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -180,11 +180,11 @@ mod pairing_reference_tests {
|
||||
/// This tests with a hardcoded known-good pairing value
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_pairing_against_sm9core() {
|
||||
use sm9_core::{G1, G2, Group};
|
||||
use libsmx::sm9::fields::fp12::fp12_to_bytes;
|
||||
use libsmx::sm9::groups::g1::G1Affine;
|
||||
use libsmx::sm9::groups::g2::G2Affine;
|
||||
use libsmx::sm9::pairing::pairing;
|
||||
use libsmx::sm9::fields::fp12::fp12_to_bytes;
|
||||
use sm9_core::{Group, G1, G2};
|
||||
|
||||
// Get sm9_core reference pairing of generators
|
||||
let g1_ref = G1::one();
|
||||
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ mod pairing_reference_tests {
|
||||
// Print both for debugging
|
||||
println!("sm9_core ref bytes[0..32]: {:02x?}", &ref_bytes[0..32]);
|
||||
println!("our bytes[0..32]: {:02x?}", &our_bytes[0..32]);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
// They can't be directly compared due to different tower structures
|
||||
// But we can verify by checking if our e(G1,G2)^order == 1
|
||||
// For now, just print to help diagnose
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user